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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ENDING PARENTS’ UNLIMITED POWER TO CHOOSE:
LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY TO PROHIBIT PARENTS’
SELECTION OF THEIR CHILDREN’S SEX AND
CHARACTERISTICS

I. INTRODUCTION
“We’ll take a blond haired, brown eyed girl, who will reach a height of
5’8” with musical talent, athletic prowess, and an IQ of 145,” requested Steve
and Kristie Robinson. The couple already had a healthy, adorable four-year
old son who exhibited intellectual aptitude and amazing physical capabilities,
and the couple now wanted a baby daughter who would exceed her peers in
every facet of life. While at first glance it may appear these parents only want
the same things all parents want for their children—the “best” life possible—
parents’ power to select the sex or other characteristics of their offspring may
render harmful moral, social, and biological consequences.1
Parents have had the ability to decide when they want to have children,
how many children they want to have, and how these children will be
conceived. Subsequent to advances in reproductive technology in 2001,
parents now have another option—to select the sex of their children prior to
conception.2 Further innovations in technology may soon allow parents to give
their children a tool for becoming the “best” of which their parents never
dreamed—the ideal genes.3 In light of the impact of procreation not only to
1. See Girls Discriminated Against before Birth, Childrens Special Session Preparatory
Committee Told, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 2, 2001, at 2001 WL 4183506. In a follow up meeting of
the United Nations 1990 World Summit for Children, a panel expressed concern about the
discrimination against females in certain parts of the world, especially in Asian countries, and the
likelihood that emerging reproductive technologies would result in an expansion of
discrimination against female children. Id.
2. Frederic Golden, Boy? Girl? Up to You, TIME.COM, Sept. 21, 1998, at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/1998/dom/980921/medicine.boy_girl_up_to17a.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2002) (reporting that a fertility center in Virginia can now offer an 85% chance
of ensuring couples that they will have a girl); Sarah Boseley, Boy or Girl? Just Sort the Sperm:
Boy or Girl? Let Machine Sort the Sperm, THE GUARDIAN (Manchester, UK), July 1, 2001, at 1.1
(reporting that English couples are likely to travel to Virginia to utilize a sperm-sorting machine
at a Virginia reproductive clinic which permits parents to select the sex of their child with 92%
accuracy for girls and 72% accuracy for boys). See also infra notes 16-26 and accompanying
text.
3. Legal institutions have yet to deal with parents’ relentless search to use reproductive
technologies to create the “best” offspring. The most striking example of how far some
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oneself, but also on one’s children, others in the present environment, and
humans who will live centuries into the future, the rights related to procreation
should be considered with respect to their potentially broad impact.4
Legislation is needed to prohibit parents’ ability to use reproductive
technologies to select the sex and traits of their children prior to conception.5
Section I of this Comment addresses the concerns associated with the selection
of traits and characteristics, methods of sex selection which are currently
available and the history and culture related to sex selection. Section II
discusses the constitutional decisions involving an individual’s choices
concerning family, conception and child rearing, and the manner in which
these cases implicate certain legal issues in relation to the regulation of
preconception selection of offspring sex and characteristics. In addition, the
potential harms associated with the use of these reproductive technologies will
be discussed to show that these tribulations meet the legitimate state interests
necessary for legislation to be upheld. Section III proposes that because the
use of these reproductive techniques should not be considered a fundamental
right of parents nor a matter protected within the realm of personal privacy, the
Supreme Court is likely to uphold legislation in this area. Finally, Section IV
discusses the legislative measures enacted in other nations and emphasizes the
need for the United States to regulate reproductive technologies that permit
preconception sex and trait selection.

prospective parents go to fulfill their desire for a genetically perfect child is the internet site at
which female and male models auction their sperm and eggs.
Rons’ Angels, at
http://ronsangels.com/index2.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2002). “The prices for gametes on sale at
ronsangels.com begin at $15,000 for sperm and egg donations and go as high as $150,000 for an
egg donation from a buxom, blond, blue-eyed ‘pop artist’ and ‘international model.’” Vida
Foubister, Reproductive Technologies Outpacing Ethical Concerns, AMEDNEWS.COM, Jan. 17,
2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amneww/pick_00?prsb0117.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2002).
4. See Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology: A Regulatory
Framework for Trait Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 188 (1993) (noting that as
technology affords individuals, particularly women, heightened powers to influence the genetic
makeup of children, novel questions arise regarding the far-reaching implications for the social
order); Marian D. Damewood, Ethical Implications of a New Application of Preimplantation
Diagnosis, 285 JAMA 3143, 3144 (2001) (arguing that the prevention of transmitting sex-linked
diseases is the only reason strong enough to override the concerns regarding sex selection). See
also Chrisian Byk, The Ethical and Legal Sense of Medically Assisted Procreation, in THE
ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 277 (Hille Haker & Deryck Beylevald eds.,
2000) (indicating that procreation “is a manifestation of our culture, our identity, our
individuality, relations we establish with others, and the perception that we have of our future and
the future of our descendants”).
5. Legislation will be needed as these technologies rapidly become available to the public.
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Harmful Consequences of Parents’ Selection of the Sex and Traits of their
Children

One concern of gender manipulation is that parents will use prebirth
genetic manipulation to give their offspring genes for intelligence, physical
attractiveness, and other positive characteristics, because it will enhance their
children’s opportunities in life without considering the far-reaching effects of
their decision.6 Since parents naturally hope for their children to be successful
in life and exemplify a certain image, parents try to provide their children with
the tools to fulfill their hopes.7 However, despite the resources parents provide
to their offspring to enhance the children’s success, children’s potential is
limited by their genetic composition and abilities.
Under typical circumstances, babies begin their lives with a unique set of
characteristics resulting from a random blending of their parents’ genes.8
Instead of this natural random combination of parents’ genes, parents may
soon be able to select the genetic makeup of their children.9 The ability to
select children’s genes—which are thought by some to be the primary
determinants of health, longevity, and success—will give parents the power to
give their offspring certain characteristics according to their personal
preferences.10 Sex selection technology fulfills parents quest for the perfect

6. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421,
436 (1996) (concluding that procreative liberty leaves parents with a fair amount of discretion
over who they want their offspring to be).
7. Multiple books, articles, and tools exist which provide parents with suggestions for
successful child-rearing strategies. See generally http://www.ridgeviewmedical.org/services/
childcare/newsletter/learning.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (discussing the types of behavior
parents should exhibit during the first twelve months of a baby’s life to enhance the baby’s
socialization and learning); WILLIAM SEARS & MARTHA SEARS, THE BABY BOOK: EVERYTHING
YOU’LL NEED TO KNOW ABOUT YOUR BABY FROM BIRTH TO AGE TWO (1st ed. 1993)
(discussing actions parents can take to benefit their babies at various stages of babies’
development).
8. See http://www.ridgeviewmedical.org/services/childcare/newsletter/learning.asp (last
visited Oct. 15, 2001).
9. See Steven Wheatley, Human Rights and Human Dignity in the Resolution of Certain
Ethical Questions in Biomedicine, 3 EUR. HEALTH L. REV. 312, 318 (2001).
10. See Robertson supra note 6, at 421 “The human genome project—the international effort
to map and sequence the entire human genome—is a major contributor to genetic consciousness,
and will continue to produce genetic discoveries for years to come.” Id. Robertson weighs
parents’ interests in procreative freedom and the unprecedented control that parents could have
over the lives of their offspring. Id. at 421-24. Ultimately, Robertson contends that the
procreative rights involved justify only limited interference. Id. at 479-82. See also Kingsley R.
Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and
the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 1038 (1995). According to Browne, the field of
behavioral genetics offers evidence of a biological basis for traits. Id. Two avenues which
evidence the influence of genes on human behavior are studies of twins and adopted children. Id.
For instance, the fact that biological siblings who are raised separately from one another tend to
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child, with parents’ expectations and fantasies of what the child will be.11 The
wake of reproductive technological advances foreshadows a world populated
with “designer” offspring whose every characteristic may be carefully selected
and produced.12
Some bioethicists express concern that sex selection will “turn children
into something ‘we make to order, like an object of our choice, a
commodity.’”13 United States culture tends to equate genetic alterations with
“playing God.”14 By equating genes with destiny, some believe that any
attempt to alter the genes of humans is an attempt to alter the destiny of the
human race itself.15
B.

Current Reproduction Technology Techniquest for Preconception Sex
Selection

The two most commonly used methods of sex selection, amniocentisis and
chorion villus biopsy, permit sex selection by terminating a pregnancy between
eight and twenty weeks into the pregnancy.16 Most people are disgusted with

exhibit more similarities to one another than unrelated children who are reared together supports
the proposition that human traits are influenced by genes to a greater degree than by environment.
Id. See generally ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 19-40 (1985) (explaining the way
humans evolved through natural selection to inherit the genes that are beneficial to human’s
survival and reproduction); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
11. See Marilyn H. Karfeld, Selecting a Baby’s Gender Raises Ethical Problems,
CLEVELAND JEWISH NEWS, Sept. 25, 1998, at 18 (indicating that Judaism sees as a virtue the
procreation of all children, girls and boys, healthy and unhealthy, such that Judaism would frown
upon wholesale, widespread sex selection because it reduces the overall uniqueness of the child).
12. Jodi Danis, Sexism and “The Superfluous Female”: Arguments for Regulating Preimplantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 219 (1995). See also Wheatley, supra note
9, at 318 (noting there is nothing novel about parents’ desire to have children of a certain sex or
with certain characteristics, but until very recently, parents did not have the ability to “design”
their prospective children); Damewood, supra note 4, at 24 (warning that the selection of sex and
desirable physical attributes of children through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis may be the
precursor to designer genes).
13. Karfeld, supra note 11, at 19-20.
14. SUSANNA HORNIG PRIEST, A GRAIN OF TRUTH: THE MEDIA, THE PUBLIC, AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 77 (2001).
15. See id. See also John B. Attanasio, Science Tests Human Dignity: The Challenges of
Genetic Engineering, 53 SMU L. REV. 455, 458-59 (2000) (discussing a hypothetical in which
the amazing results achieved in experiments aimed at increasing babies’ intelligence by injecting
a new drug into eggs prior to in-vitro fertilization and the constitutional implications of this
research).
16. M.C. Macnaughton, Prenatal Sex Selection, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND THE LAW
47 (A. Allan Templeton & Douglas J. Cusine eds., 1990) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of these methods of sex selection). See also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Privacy and
the Regulation of the Technologies: A Decision-Making Approach, 22 FAM. L.Q. 173, 194 (1988)
(indicating that other methods of reproductive genetic manipulation include alteration of the fetus
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the notion of aborting a fetus based on the unborn child’s sex, but recent
technological innovations do not even require the production of an embryo for
sex selection to occur. 17 When couples undergo in vitro fertilization, eggs and
sperm combine in a lab dish to create an embryo and specialists can tell with
almost 100 percent accuracy which embryos are male or female by genetically
testing a single cell.18 “Fertility clinics long have used this technique to help
couples at high risk of bearing children with gender-linked genetic diseases to
pick which embryo to have implanted.”19
A very recent advance in reproductive technology provides parents with an
accurate method of selecting the sex of their children prior to conception.20
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and sperm sorting through flow
cytometry are two innovative reproductive methods, which offer parents the
chance to select the sex of their progeny.21 Scientists at a fertility clinic in
Fairfax, Virginia, announced in May 2001 that they developed a spermseparation method, which will allow parents to choose the sex of their child.22
Sperm carrying the Y-chromosomes, which create male offspring, contains two
and a half percent less DNA than X-chromosomes, which create female
offspring.23 By separating and removing sperm more likely to produce boys or
using in utero fetal therapy and that the future may bring gene substitution and modification,
pathogenesis, and cloning).
17. See Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted
Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 330-33 (1991)
(summarizing a review of reports, bills, and legislation from around the world from 1987-1999 to
indicate that a general world consensus indicates that “neither sex selection of embryos, except
for sex-linked diseases, nor eugenic selection should be allowed”).
18. Picking Baby’s Sex Gets Support, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at A24 (announcing the
statement of a fertility clinic ethics chairman that it is ethical for parents to select the sex of their
offspring).
19. Id. “Critics long have considered gender selection for non-medical reasons as a form of
sex discrimination and the start as a slippery slope toward choosing children on the basis of other
traits.” Id.
20. See Rachel E. Remaley, “The Original Sexist Sin”: Regulating Preconception Sex
Selection Technology, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 252-53 (2000) (explaining the uses in the rapidly
emerging reproductive technology in the forms of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and spermsorting, both of which permit parents to select or avoid certain features in their offspring). See
also John O’Farrell, Secrets of the Sperm Machine, THE GUARDIAN, July 7, 2001, available at
2001 WL 24302449, at *1 (indicating that a clinic is charging $2,000 for couples to use the
“sperm sorting machine” to choose the sex of their child).
21. Remaley, supra note 20, at 253-54 (noting that prospective parents who use in vitro
fertilization are more likely to have a child of the desired sex than parents who use innovative
sperm sorting techniques).
22. See Karfeld, supra note 11. Once the sperm are sorted, pregnancy is achieved through
artificial insemination. Id.
23. Id. This method is “remarkably accurate.” Id. “Using this technology for parents who
wanted girls, 10 out of 11 babies born were female.” Id. The rate of success is slightly lower for
boys. Id.
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girls and then using the preferred sperm for artificial insemination, this
technology allows parents to choose the sex of their offspring with remarkable
accuracy.24
Sperm-separation techniques are the most reliable method available of sex
selection currently available, with estimates of an eighty-six percent success
rate.25 In May 2001, the chairman of the American Medical Association ethics
group published a policy saying that, under certain conditions, doctors could
offer preconception sex selection services to families who already have
children and now want another baby of the opposite gender.26
C. The History of Sex Selection Indicates that Parents Will Use Reproductive
Technologies to Select their Children’s Sex and Traits
Considering the historical use of sex selection methods, parents will take
advantage of innovative reproductive technologies to select the sex and traits
of their children. For centuries, parents practiced various techniques to ensure
that their progeny would be of a certain sex, usually male. Even in ancient
times, people attempt to control the sex of their offspring. Old wives’ tales
claimed that by tying the left testicle or by having the husband lie on a certain
side of the bed ensured the birth of a male offspring.27 Parents attempted to
copulate on certain dates, believing this would ensure the birth of a child of a
certain sex.28 In the Talmud, Jewish rabbis instruct men in methods to ensure
the birth of male children.29 The Greek physician Hippocrates advised parents
that if a daughter was desired the man “should tie off the right testicle as much
as he can bear it;” if a son was desired, the man “should have relations with his
24. See Picking Baby’s Sex, supra note 18, at A24. At this early stage in the technology, the
success rates are higher for female offspring than for male offspring. Id.
25. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 139 (1995) (indicating that at least seventy clinics in
the United States used variations of the sperm separation procedure to select sex chromosomespecific sperm).
26. Picking Baby’s Sex, supra note 18, at A24 (indicating that this is only the opinion of the
committee’s chairman and the committee’s position discouraging sex selection stands until the
committee reaches an updated conclusion).
27. See
also
Choosing
Your
Baby’s
Sex:
The
Folk
Wisdom,
at
http://www.womencentral.msn.com/babies/articles/preconception.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2002)
(offering the following methods to conceive a baby of the desired sex: eating vegetables and
chocolate, having sex in the missionary position and dancing the “baby dance” when the moon is
full to conceive a female child; eating red meat, cola, and salty snacks, having sex when there is a
quarter moon in the sky and making love standing up to conceive a male child).
28. The Selnas method is one of natural selection of the gender of mammal babies based on
the alternating polarity cycle in the ovum membrane, which selects the sperm containing the X or
the Y chromosome. See http://www.babygenderselection.com/scientific_review.html. (last
visited Oct. 15, 2001)
29. See Karfeld, supra note 11 (explaining that parents have historically been interested in
selecting the sex of their offspring).
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wife at the end of her period and should thrust as hard as he can until
ejaculation.”30 Other methods over the centuries included high potassium and
sodium diets and turning the nuptial bed to face the north wind, and precise
timing of intercourse.31 Pro-Care Industries manufactured a “child-selection
kit” in 1986, which was sold for $49.95, which purported to allow parents to
monitor vaginal mucus to select the sex of their offspring.32
Some parents take extreme measures to assure the birth of a child of the
preferred sex. Parents’ practice of infanticide to secure their offspring’s
gender is a common phenomenon in many cultures.33 In an investigation of
two hospitals in India that used abortion as a method of selecting the birth of
male children, the study found that at one hospital in 1976-1977, almost
twenty-five percent of the women admitted wanted to know the sex of their
fetus so they could abort it if the fetus was female.34
In the United States, some couples will abort a fetus after genetic testing
determines the fetus is of the undesired sex.35 Some measures of ensuring the
birth of a child of the “right” sex are less drastic, but still suggest that parents
are likely to use this technology if available. There is a growing belief among
individuals, geneticists and physicians that people are entitled to sex selection
if they request it.36 In a survey of genetic clinic patients, sixty percent of those
surveyed believed they had a right to referrals for any service they could pay

30. ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNING BABIES: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY 163 (1999).
31. Id. at 164. In ancient Egypt, the methods for predicting the sex of children was to
sprinkle the urine of a woman on a few grains of barley and emmer. Id. If both sprouted, the
woman was pregnant. Id. If only barley sprouted, the child was male; if only emmer sprouted,
the child was female. Id.
32. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 25, at 139 (noting that the product was shortly taken
off the market when the Federal Drug Administration reported that some of the product’s claims
were unsupported).
33. Id. at 138.
34. A. Ramanamma & Usha Bambawale, The Mania for Sons: An Analysis of Social Values
in South Asia, 14B SOC. SCI. & MED. 107, 108 (1980). The study revealed that of the 700
pregnant women who visited the hospital during the year of the study, 430 of the 450 women that
carried female fetuses aborted their fetuses. Id.
35. See Karfeld, supra note 11. The number of parents who abort children of the undesired
sex is difficult to determine because most parents do not admit that they abort a fetus because
they desire a child of the other sex. Id.
36. Dorothy C. Wertz, Patients’ and Professionals’ Views on Autonomy, Disability, and
“Discrimination”: Results of a 36-Nation Survey, in THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC
RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 171, 173 (Timothy A. Caulfield & Bryn
Williams-Jones eds., 1999). But see Mark I. Evans, et al., Attitudes on the Ethics of Abortion, Sex
Selection, and Selective Pregnancy Termination Among Health Care Professionals, Ethicists, and
Clergy Likely to Encounter Such Situations, 164 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1098 (1991)
(reporting findings on an empirical study indicating that the attitudes of health care providers is
that sex-selective abortions are unethical).
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for, including sex selection.37 Given this history of parents’ utilization of
techniques to enhance the possibility of the birth of a child with a certain sex, it
is likely that parents will take advantage of technology allowing them to select
the sex and other characteristics of their offspring as this technology becomes
available.38 As the number of children in American families decreases,
couples will be more likely to utilize technologies for controlling the
characteristics of their children.39
Many prenatal diagnostic technologies are currently being used in the
United States to reduce the incidence of birth defects, especially for women at
risk of producing abnormal offspring.40 The problem arises as to where the

37. See Wertz, supra note 36, at 173 (noting the emphasis on autonomy displayed by
patients in the United States).
38. See J.M. Berkowitz, Two Boys and a Girl Please and Hold the Mustard, 114 PUBLIC
HEALTH 5, 5 (2000) (noting that the desire to select the sex of one’s children has remained strong
since at least the time of Hippocrates, so it is likely that parents will utilize this technology when
it becomes available).
39. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 25, at 138 (indicating that this trend is already present
among families in the United States).
40. Id. at 134. Parents attempt to avoid the birth of a child with sickle-cell anemia through
the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Id. Although the first pregnancy achieved by
preimplantation genetic diagnosis to avoid the transmission of a sex-linked disorder occurred
nearly a decade ago, the first unaffected pregnancy using preimplantation genetic diagnosis
occurred in 1997. Id. See Kangpu Xu et al., First Unaffected Pregnancy Using Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis for Sickle Cell Anemia, 281 JAMA 1701, 1706 (1999) (concluding that the
study’s first unaffected pregnancy resulting from preimplantation genetic diagnosis for sickle cell
anemia demonstrates that the technique can be a powerful diagnostic tool for carrier couples who
desire a healthy child but wish to avoid the difficult decision of whether to abort an affected
fetus); Lindsey Tanner, Gene-Screening Cases Raises Doubts, STAR-LEDGER (Newark N.J.), Feb.
27, 2002, at 8 (discussing the usefulness of preimplantation genetic selection to avoid having a
child with early-onset Alzheimer’s). Preimplantation genetic diagnosis is an unregulated, marketdriven area of science, with some clinics already using the test for gender selection and others
willing to test for whatever is scientifically feasible. Some parents use sex selection methods to
avoid giving birth to a child with a sex-linked genetic diseases. However, such sex-linked
diseases are rare, and most people use sex determination for other reasons. Sex selection for
medical purposes is a distinct phenomenon from sex selection for personal or cultural reasons.
Many believe that determining a child’s sex prior to birth is unconditionally justified if there are
reasons to presume the child will be born with an incurable pathology, but would be unethical if
such selection methods were used only for social reasons. See Macnaughton, supra note 16, at 50
(indicating that most people agree the use of sex selection to avoid sex-linked diseases is
justifiable on medical grounds). See also Damewood, supra note 5 (reviewing various arguments
for sex selection from a physician’s point of view and concluding that avoidance of sex-linked
genetic disease is the only justification strong enough for the use of sex selection technology);
A.Y. Ivanyushkin, New Reproductive Technologies in Russia, in CREATING THE CHILD 273
(Donald Evans ed., 1996); Gian Carlo Di Renzo et al., Control of Human Reproduction, in
CREATING THE CHILD 41 (Donald Evans ed., 1996) (discussing the current technologies which
will permit humans growing control over the physical characteristics of their descendants); 139
CONG. REC. S4716 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (indicating that 195,000
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line should be drawn between what constitutes a disorder, which is serious
enough to warrant selecting a child of the other sex.41 Because the issues
involved in the use of reproductive technologies to select offspring
characteristics for medical reasons is distinguishable from the use of these
methods to select the sex and characteristics for personal reasons, medical
selection of offspring characteristics will not be addressed in this Comment.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
A.

A Deferential Rational Review Analysis Applies to Preconception Sex and
Trait Selection Because a Fundamental Right Is Not Implicated in
Parents’ Decisions to Use Reproductive Technologies for the Purpose of
Sex and Trait Selection

The traditional due process analysis involves a consideration of when a
regulation impinges on a fundamental right. The first step entails determining
whether a right is, in fact, fundamental.42 Where certain fundamental rights are
involved, the Supreme Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may
be justified only by a “compelling state interest” and that legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest
at stake.43

abortions follow prenatal testing for genetic defects each year). Because of the distinct issues
presented, sex selection for therapeutic reasons will not be discussed in detail in this Comment.
41. See D. Morgan, Legal and Ethical Dilemmas of Fetal Sex Identification and Gender
Selection, in REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND THE LAW 53, 66 (A. Allan Templeton & Douglas J.
Cusine eds., 1990).
42. If the Court determines that a fundamental right is implicated, the Court must rigorously
scrutinize the government interests in regulating the area to determine whether the government
interests are substantial and whether the regulation is the only practical means of furthering those
state interests. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin
statute denying marriage licenses to any Wisconsin resident who is under an obligation to support
a child not in the person’s custody and is unable to demonstrate compliance with the order to pay
child support and that the child is not likely to become a charge of the state).
43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (holding that to be fair, reasonable and an appropriate use of a state’s police power, an act
must have a direct means-end relationship with an appropriate and legitimate state objective);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (striking down as unconstitutional a Nebraska
law which prohibits the teaching of any subject in any language other than the English language
in schools below the eighth grade; the law could not be sustained because it bore no reasonable
relation to any end within the competency of the state, and deprives teachers and parents of
liberty without due process of law). The state may not interfere with the liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause by legislative actions, which are arbitrary, or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect. Id.
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When a fundamental right is not implicated, the Court will analyze the
statute using the highly deferential rational basis standard of review.44 The test
used by the Court considers whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.45 Courts almost always uphold the challenged legislation
when the rational basis review applies.46
This Comment proposes that parents’ right to select the sex and traits of
their children should not be deemed a fundamental right under the
constitutionally protected right of personal privacy. This section will
demonstrate that the use of reproductive technologies to select the sex and
traits of one’s offspring does not implicate the same guarantees of personal
privacy and autonomy implicit in the Supreme Court decisions relating to
pregnancy, abortion, children and family. Given this, the legitimate
government interest in preventing the harmful effects of the use of this
reproductive technology should allow a ban to pass the rational basis test.47
Therefore, state regulations in this area of reproductive technology will be
upheld by a mere showing that the state has a rational basis for the law.48

44. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955) (The rational
basis standard of review is applied to most social and economic regulations.). See also
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (holding that loss of liberty by confinement for
mental illness called for showing that the individual suffers from a condition more serious than
idiosyncratic behavior; reasonable doubt standard is inappropriate in civil proceedings attempting
to deprive a citizen of the substantial right of freedom from confinement). The Court has stated
that when considering individual rights, the standard of proof, at a minimum, reflects the value
society places on individual liberty. Id. However, this is not the circumstance when considering
preconception sex and trait selection.
45. The burden is on the challenger of the regulation.
46. See United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (refusing to continue
analyzing a federal statute after determining that the rational basis review applied). See also
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Even if preconception
sex and trait selection were considered an exercise of an individual’s fundamental personal liberty
interest, the magnitude of the state interests in preventing the harms associated with the use of
these techniques outweighs the individual rights implicated, such that a ban on preconception sex
selection procedures would have to pass a strict scrutiny test under the Constitution.
47. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (noting that a regulation to which strict scrutiny applies can
survive only if it furthers a compelling state interest, such as health).
48. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Although
education is one of the most important services performed by the State, it is not within the limited
category of rights recognized by the Supreme Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. at 35.
Therefore, education is not subject to heightened protection as a fundamental liberty interest and
it would be inappropriate for the Court to apply strict scrutiny in this case. See id. at 36-70.
Given the broad range of harms resulting from the use of this technology, the Court will
unquestionably locate a rational basis for regulation.
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Constitutional Sources of Protection of Procreation, Reproduction and
Family Interests

When considering the reach of constitutional protections afforded to rights
related to family, procreation and children, the Supreme Court often bases its
decisions on a combination of rights implicated under the Due Process Clause,
constitutional guarantees in the realm of personal privacy and the Equal
Protection Clause. Since the Court and the legislature have yet to address the
constitutionality of the regulation of preconception sex and trait selection,
rights related to contraception, abortion, marriage and family will be
considered in this Comment. Advocates of the unregulated use of reproductive
technologies for parental sex and trait selection erroneously cite these cases as
lending support for their position. In response, this section will examine the
extent of those constitutional guarantees and why they should not be extended
to permit the use of these harmful reproductive technologies.49
1.

Protection of Personal and Family Decisions Under the Due Process
Clause

Guarantees of substantive due process protect matters relating to marriage,
family and procreation.50 The scope of the pre-birth liberty rights to select
offspring sex and characteristics depends upon inquiries into whether the
characteristic in question is central or material to a reproductive decision, and
the nature, severity and probability of harms that flow from the pre-birth
selection of characteristics.51 The Due Process Clause of the Constitution
includes a substantive component, which provides heightened protection

49. See John A. Robertson, Noncoital Reproduction and Procreative Liberty, in THE ETHICS
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 252 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992) (discussing the “scope of
procreative liberty and the extent of constitutional protection for noncoital conception and its
collaborative variations”).
50. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (citing family law cases in a criminal
procedure case, the Court addressed its reluctance to expand the rights protected by substantive
due process).
51. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 429. The harms may include “destruction of embryos
and fetuses, harm to offspring, instrumentalizing or commodifying human life, discrimination on
the basis of gender or disability, and easing the way to non-medical enhancement.” Id. Whether
the characteristic is central or material to the reproductive decision is one aspect that also
implicates the question of whether the characteristic should be central or material to the
reproductive decision. Id. Generally, it is unacceptable for any characteristic selected for nonmedical reasons to influence parents’ decision whether or not to give birth to such a child. Id. at
436. For instance, our society accepts the notion that parents may choose not to have a child who
will suffer from a serious genetic disease, but will not tolerate the idea that parents may choose
not to have a child because the child has the wrong hair color. Id.
OF
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against government interference with individual liberty interests under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.52
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution extends to the states the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause’s guarantee that “no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”53 “Liberty”
denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint[,] but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and bring up children . . . and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and women].54

The right to have children has also been upheld on the ground that an
individual has a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of equal
protection under the law.55 The Supreme Court considered the right to have
children one of the “basic civil rights of man” which deserved protection as a
fundamental right.56 Liberty protection is also afforded in some circumstances
to marry, have children, direct the education and upbringing of one’s children,
use of contraception, bodily integrity, and abortion.57 However, the Court
52. The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment
extends this prohibition to the states, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (holding that the Washington child visitation law violated parents’
fundamental right to make decisions related to the care, custody, and control of their children by
permitting any person to seek visitation of the children even though the parents object to such
visitation).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
54. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted). In Meyer, an
instructor at a parochial school in Nebraska was convicted of unlawfully teaching the subject of
reading in the German language to a ten-year-old child. Id. at 396-97. At the time the court
convicted the instructor, a Nebraska law prohibited the teaching of any language other than
English at any public or private school. Id. at 397. Justice McReynolds’ majority opinion held
that the statute infringed upon parents’ liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 400. In striking down the Nebraska law, the Court focused on the importance
of education. The Court rejected the state’s argument that a rational state interest existed, holding
that a child’s learning the German language was not injurious to the health, morals, or
understanding of the ordinary child. Id. at 403. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 65 (1973) (emphasizing the Court’s precedent that commercial activities are not “private”
matters protected by constitutional rights of privacy).
55. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In Skinner, the
Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in which the state law called for sterilization of criminals convicted of
two or more felonies involving moral turpitude. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion made it evident that people do not have an unlimited right to do with their
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limits fundamental liberty interests and urges restraint when considering
expanding fundamental liberty interests.58 For instance, fundamental liberty
interest protection has not been extended to the right of children’s education
and the right to engage sexual activity in the privacy of one’s own home
between two consenting adults.59
2.

Constitutional Guarantee of Personal Privacy

A personal right of privacy, or at least a guarantee of certain areas or zones
or privacy, is constitutionally protected. While no explicit textual basis exists
for the right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized this right on several
occasions.60 Under certain circumstances, the right of personal privacy
encompasses the right to marry,61 procreate,62 use contraception63 and abort a

bodies as they please. The Court in Glucksberg held that the right to assistance in committing
suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 728.
58. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality
of a Georgia sodomy statute).
59. See id. at 191. See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34
(1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right in an equal protection case challenging a
state educational funding plan on the basis that it discriminated against students who resided in
poorer districts).
60. The Court has cited various sources for this right of privacy, including the Ninth
Amendment, and the “penumbras” or “emanations” of provisions of the Bill of Rights. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In Griswold, the Planned Parenthood
League’s directors were convicted under the Connecticut birth control law for providing
contraceptive devices and relevant information to married couples. Id. at 480. The Supreme
Court, per Justice Douglas, held that the Connecticut law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the
right of marital privacy. Id. at 485. The law, by “forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than
regulating their manufacture or sale, [sought] to achieve its goal by means having a maximum
destructive relationship on a marital relationship.” Id.
61. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (referring to the right to marry as a “basic civil
right”). In Loving, Warren’s majority held that the miscegenation statutes adopted by Virginia to
prevent marriages between persons solely on basis of racial classification violated equal
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2. States have the power
to regulate marriage, but only to a certain degree. Id. at 7. The Court found an invidious racial
discrimination in Virginia’s statute prohibiting marriage between different races. Id. at 12.
62. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (invalidating a
statute providing for the sterilization of “habitual criminals”). The Court held that the right to
procreate is “one of the basic civil rights of [humans]” and classifications affecting it are judged
by the strict equal protection test. Id. at 541.
63. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (recognizing marital privacy as one of the specific
penumbras of privacy found in the Bill of Rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972)
(holding that the right to use contraception was an individual privacy right which applied to
single persons as well as to married persons); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 678
(1977) (holding that a state cannot prohibit distribution of non-medical contraceptives to adults
except through license pharmacists, nor prohibit sales of such contraceptives to persons under age
sixteen who did not have approval of a licensed physician). See generally Roe v. Wade, 410
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fetus. “But it is a mistake to equate privacy with a general constitutional right
to engage in any or all of these important activities free from governmental
interference.”64 The Court advocates the use of great restraint when expanding
the contours of constitutional due process.65
The right of personal privacy exists under the Constitution, and only
personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty are included in the guarantee of personal privacy.66 The right
of privacy guaranteed by the Constitution includes only an individual’s
personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.67 This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal
intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, child
rearing68 and education.69 It is broad enough to encompass a woman’s right to
choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy in certain circumstances.70
U.S. 113, 152-57 (1973) (noting that this right of personal privacy is implicit in the concept of
“liberty” within the protection of the Due Process Clause).
64. Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1998). “[T]he constitutional right of privacy casts a mantle of
immunity from state interference around certain intimate and consensual relationships.” Id.
When individuals call upon the state to assist them actively in their interactions with other
individuals, this right of privacy dissipates. Id. at 1079. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
196 (1986) (upholding state criminal charges against a gay man charged with violating a state law
criminalizing sodomy). In Bowers, Justice White’s majority opinion held that the Constitution
does not grant a fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy. Id. at 191. The
Georgia statute was constitutional given the fact that a fundamental right was not involved and
the state provided a rational basis for the statute. Id. at 196.
65. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (refusing to expand fundamental rights even when the activity
occurred in the privacy of one’s home). Historically, fundamental liberties identified by the
Court include liberties implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or liberties deeply rooted in this
nation’s history and traditions. Id. at 191.
66. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. If a zone of privacy is identified, the state must narrowly draw a
regulation to serve a compelling interest for the government to constitutionally intrude upon this
zone. Id. at 155. The use of preconception sex and trait selection does not implicate a privacy
right, so the courts will use a “rational basis” test to uphold laws in this area. Id. The security of
one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion from the government is basic to a free society and
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and as such it is enforceable against the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 152-53.
67. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973). Chief Justice Burger noted
that conduct, which directly involves “consenting adults”, does not have, for that sole reason,
special claim to constitutional protection. Id. at 68. The states have a legitimate interest in
regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all places of public
accommodation. Id. at 69. Georgia had a legitimate state interest in keeping adolescents from
exposure to the obscene material. Id. Furthermore, there is no privacy right in a commercial
theater. Id. Likewise, no special relationship exists when a couple visits a medical institution to
control the gender fate of the their potential child.
68. See id. at 65.
69. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that legislation that
mandated normal children aged eight to sixteen attend public school unreasonably interfered with
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The rights of privacy under the Constitution should not extend to parents’
use of reproductive technologies to make these decisions since the matters
involved in selecting a child’s sex or characteristics are not fundamental rights.
While precedent suggests some limits to these constitutional guarantees of
privacy, the outer limits of protected liberty interests have yet to be definitively
established.71 Based on family and reproductive precedent, some argue that
parents’ decisions to select the sex and traits of their children are within this
realm of protected liberty interests.72 The Supreme Court cases analyzing the
realm of protected liberty interests reveal that the interests implicated by
parents’ use of preconception sex and trait selection technologies are not as
fundamental to the “common occupations of life” nor “as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” as the rights involved in these prior
decisions. Privacy should not be equated with a license to engage in any
personal activity without state interference.73 Constitutional privacy rights do
not provide individuals with a right to enter the commerce of reproduction
because such activities do not implicate private relationships.74
C. Historical Protection of Decisions Related to Procreation, Family and
Children Does Not Extend to the Use of Preconception Sex and Trait
Selection Technologies
1.

Parents’ Right in the Care and Upbringing of their Children Does Not
Extend to the Right to Use Sex and Trait Selection Technologies.

Freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life
are liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

parental rights); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (concluding that the right of
parents to instruct their children was within the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
71. See Jones, supra note 4, at 189 (noting that the boundaries of personal liberty into which
the government may not enter continue to be the subject of considerable debate). See also Rao,
supra note 64, at 1077-78 (arguing that privacy is currently miscast as a misunderstood individual
right that must be reconceived as a relational right in order to capture its social dimension).
72. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 424-25 (asserting that a stronger argument may be made
for the use of reproductive technologies as a liberty interest under reproductive freedom than
under parents’ rights to control their child’s upbringing because of the close connection between
the characteristics of the child and the decision whether or not to reproduce). See also Robertson,
supra note 49, at 252 (focusing on the rights of married persons to reproduce through the use of
reproductive technologies).
73. See Rao, supra note 64, at 1078. The right of privacy, according to Rao, “casts a mantle
of immunity from state interference around certain intimate and consensual relationships,” but
should not be equated with a general constitutional guarantee to engage in any family, child
rearing or sexual activity without governmental interference. Id.
74. Id. at 1079 (discussing the applicability of the right to privacy to a variety of assisted
reproductive technologies).
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Amendment.75 The Supreme Court recognized parents’ fundamental liberty
interest in the care, custody, upbringing, management76 and control of their
children.77 These matters may involve the intimate and personal choices,
which are central to personal dignity and autonomy, and liberty interests,
which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.78
In 1925, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society Sisters recognized parents’
constitutionally protected interest in raising their children in accordance with
their preferences.79 In Pierce, the Court declared that an Oregon law requiring
attendance at public schools unconstitutionally violated parents’ Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in directing the upbringing and education of their
children.80 In his majority opinion, Justice McReynolds recognized that
parents who “nurture [a child] and direct [the child’s] destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [her or] him for
additional obligations.”81 In establishing parents’ right to select the forum for
their children’s education, the Court affirmed a state’s authority to supervise
all schools.82

75. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974). See also Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (including length
of time grandparents may visit with the grandchildren). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, includes a substantive component that
provides heightened protection from government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests, including parents rights to make decisions as to care, custody and control of their
children. Id.
76. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that a New York statute’s “fair
preponderance of the evidence” standard necessary to permanently take children away from their
natural parents denied the parents’ due process and that the state must support its allegations with
at least clear and convincing evidence).
77. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affirming parents’ right to
control their offspring except where, to here, that right conflicts with other state laws). The
defendant, who was the children’s custodian, was convicted of furnishing a child with magazines
to unlawfully sell them on the street. Id. Accord Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64 (holding a Washington
state statute providing that any person may petition the court for visitation with a child at any
time and the court may grant such visitation rights, violated parents’ liberty interests by
substituting the judgment of the court for the parents’ judgment).
78. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (reviewing
the history of cases protecting family and procreative decisions to set the stage for the Court’s
analysis of the Pennsylvania abortion statute which restricted abortion).
79. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Pierce involved two lawsuits by religious academic
institutions enjoining the State of Oregon from enforcing the Compulsory Education Act of 1922,
which required children to attend public schools. Id. at 529-30.
80. Id. at 534-35 (noting that the state has authority to compel children to attend an
educational institution and to inspect, supervise, and examine those institutions).
81. Id .at 535.
82. Id. at 534 (indicating that the state regulates educational institutions on the subjects
taught, teachers, the requirement that children attend an educational institution, and the state’s
authority to inspect, examine, and supervise schools).
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In reaffirming parents’ limited freedom from state interference with the
care, custody, and nurture of their children in Prince v. Massachusetts, the
Court emphasized that the rights of parents are not beyond limitation.83 In a
five to four majority opinion, Justice Rutledge indicated that the state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child’s welfare, even if parents’ decisions rest on religious or
ethical grounds.84 The Court based its decision on the rationale that a
“democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,” and the state may take a
broad range of actions to promote this goal.85
The Constitution affords protection to the right to have and raise offspring
without undue state interference.86 In reaching its conclusion in Skinner v.
Oklahoma that the Oklahoma regulation providing for the sterilization of
certain criminals was unconstitutional, the Court stated, “Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of [humans].”87
The Court considered the subtle, far reaching, and devastating effects of
sterilization.88 The Court’s majority argument in Skinner lends support to the
argument that preconception selection of offspring sex and characteristics
should be regulated. An individual’s right to have children is based on the fact
that procreation is essential to the proliferation of our species.89 Similar to
83. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
84. See id. at 168 (noting that the state’s power is not nullified by parents’ claims that their
acts in relation to their children’s care and upbringing are based on religious or ethical rationales).
The Court also noted that a parent’s religious beliefs do not put parents at liberty to claim their
children should not be subject to compulsory vaccination, therefore exposing their children to
communicable diseases, ill health, or death. Id.
85. See id. (indicating that the state’s right to regulate activities related to children is broader
than its right to regulate adult’s activities). Based upon this proposition, sex selection should be a
prime candidate for legislation because it deeply impacts the lives of our children.
86. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that constitutional liberty includes
the right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children).
87. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the
Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act which called for the operation of vasectomy to be
performed on a criminal defendant who was convicted of stealing chickens and robbery with
firearms violated defendant’s equal protection rights).
88. Id. “In evil or reckless hands, [this method of punishment] can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.” Id. The majority focused on
the irreparable harm that may result if the state is permitted to meddle with eugenics in this
fashion. See id. Interestingly, the Court addressed concerns in its Skinner opinion that are
analogous to the hazards inherent in the use of preconception sex and trait selection. In both
instances, the state attempts to use eugenics to build a race with more favorable qualities, but the
dangers in engaging in this type of science outweigh the grave risks.
89. Id. Justice Douglas focused on the fact that Oklahoma’s statute deprives an individual’s
basic right to have offspring. See id. The Court’s opposition to Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal
Sterilization law seemed to be based, in part, on the state’s alteration of the natural reproductive
process by sterilizing criminals. Id.
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sterilization, the selection of offspring characteristics jeopardizes the future of
humanity.90 Moreover, if parents select the sex and characteristics of their
offspring, they will alter the natural reproductive process, which may result in
serious adverse consequences to both the child herself or himself and to others
in the child’s environment.91
The Court elaborated in a subsequent decision, Wisconsin v. Yoder, that
“the history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.”92 The
government should not include preconception methods in the realm of child
rearing and upbringing decisions previously protected by the Court. Parents
make child-rearing decisions throughout the child’s life-time, while adjusting
their decisions to accommodate for the changing needs of the child. In
contrast, parents’ choice to select the sex and traits of their children is a single
decision made prior to birth, at a time when it is difficult for parents to
ascertain whether the decisions they implement are in the best interest of their
child.
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court stated that another fundamental right under
the Due Process Clause is the right to be free, except in limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.93 Justice White’s
majority opinion in Stanley held that an unwed father was entitled to a hearing
testing his fitness as a father before his children could be taken away from him
subsequent to the death of the children’s mother.94 The policy under Illinois
law for considering unwed fathers as unfit parents but considering married
fathers as fit parents violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.95
Following the Meyer line of cases, White’s majority opinion struck down the
law as “it needlessly risk[ed] running roughshod over the important interests of

90. See infra Part III.
91. Id.
92. 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1971).
93. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
94. Id. An unwed father whose children, on the mother’s death, were by Illinois law
declared state wards and placed in guardianship, attacked the Illinois statutory scheme as a denial
of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 646. Under the Illinois law, the children of unmarried
fathers, upon the death of the mother, were declared dependents without any hearing on parental
fitness and without proof of neglect, although such hearing and proof were required for unmarried
mothers in the father’s situation. Id. at 646-47.
95. Id. Even if the State was correct that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and
neglectful parents, all unmarried fathers are not in this category. Id. at 650. To presume the
father in this case was such an unsuitable father violated his Due Process rights. Id. at 657. The
Court based its decision to promote the state of moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of
the minor child, the best interests of the community and the strengthening of the minor’s family
ties. Id. at 651-52.
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both parent and child.”96 This right of privacy protects Americans’ beliefs,
thoughts, emotions and sensations.
The rights of biological parents are limited, and may be outweighed by
public policy and the “best interests of the child.”97 For instance, in Michael
H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court cited policy reasons when holding that a
California statute which creates a presumption that a child born to a married
woman living with her husband is the child of the husband (provided the
husband is not impotent or sterile) did not violate procedural due process rights
of the putative biological father.98 With sex and trait selection, the public
policy issues and the “best interests of the child” standard outweigh any rights
parents may have in controlling the genetic makeup of their children.
The Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville struck down a Washington
statute providing that any person may petition a court for visitation at any time
and that court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may
serve the best interests of the child.99 The Court held that the statute violated
substantive due process rights of parents.100 In Troxel, the mother’s due
process rights were violated by the application of the Washington statute which
permitted the court to use its own discretion to award increased visitation to
paternal grandparents, following the death of children’s father, in disagreement
with the mother’s decision.101

96. Id. at 657. In Stanley, the child’s father lived with the child’s mother for eighteen years
but never married. Id. at 646. Under the Illinois statutory scheme, the children of an unwed
father upon the death of the mother, were declared dependents of the state without any hearing of
parental fitness and without any showing of neglect. Id. Despite the possibility that unmarried
fathers are unfit parents, Due Process dictates that fathers are entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Id. at 658. All Illinois parents are entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are
removed from their custody. Id. The Court disregarded the state’s reasons for this regulation. Id.
97. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Accord Henne v. Wright,
904 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that parents do not have a fundamental right to give
their child a surname at birth with which the child has no legally established parental connection,
and state statute bore a rational relationship to legitimate state interests); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652
(indicating the state’s protection of the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the
minor and the best interests of the community and the strengthening of the minor’s family ties
whenever possible are legitimate interests well within the power of the state to implement).
98. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125-30. Despite blood test results which indicated a 98.07%
probability of paternity, the putative father was not permitted the opportunity to demonstrate
paternity as it violated California’s public policy of protection of “family integrity and privacy.”
Id. at 110, 120. The Court emphasized that the Due Process Clause affords only those protections
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Id. at
122.
99. 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000).
100. Id.
101. Id. (indicating that, at a minimum, the trial judge should have afforded special weight to
a mother’s determination of the appropriate amount of visitation between children and
grandparents when considering the best interests of the children).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

536

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:517

The above cases do not consider the extent to which parents’ interests in
their children’s “upbringing” extends to parents’ rights to select the sex and
characteristics of their children. In fact, federal courts have yet to decide
whether the use of any reproductive technologies should be afforded
constitutional protection. When courts make this decision, they should
recognize the unique nature of the issues and harms presented by
preconception sex and trait selection.102 While the courts traditionally
recognized parents’ freedom to make decisions for their children (or potential
children), the rights and best interests of children are not unrecognized.103
When considering sex and trait selection, both parent and child have
compelling interests in this process. If sex and trait selection based on parental
preference is prohibited, parents’ rights in the care and upbringing of their
children after birth will not be limited in any manner.104 Parents will still enjoy
the same freedoms to care and make decisions for their children as they had in
the past.
When the Supreme Court decided Pierce in 1925 or Prince in 1944, it did
not anticipate the potential meanings of a parent’s duty to “[control] the
[child’s] destiny” eighty years later. 105 However, the fact remains that the
government may regulate parents’ decisions when necessary to avoid harm.
Similar to parents’ choice of education and religious upbringing of their
children, parents’ selection of the sex and characteristics of their children are
methods for parents to give their children what the parents believe are the
“best” options available to enhance their children’s opportunities for success in
life. However, parents’ use of sex and trait selection reproductive technologies
has more potential to cause devastating harm than education and religious
decisions.
Permitting parents to select their children’s sex and traits gives parents
unprecedented control over their children’s “destiny.” The state has a strong
interest in assuring that children are well-educated so that when the children
reach adulthood, they will be capable to perform in the work place and support
themselves. Similarly, the state also has a substantial interest in assuring that
the United States does not incur problems which may be associated with the
use of sex and trait selection technologies, such as gender imbalance in the
population, serious psychological and social consequences to children resulting
from knowledge that they were altered by their parents’ whims or that they
were a mistake whom their parents did not desire, adverse consequences due to
alteration of natural selection, and discrimination against those who do not

102. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
103. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64.
104. Sex and trait selection based on parental preference is distinguished from sex selection
for medical reasons, a topic which is not addressed in this Note.
105. See Pierce v. Soc’y Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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have the opportunities to utilize sex and trait selection technologies. Like
education, sex and trait selection should be highly regulated by the state to
ensure that when children are born and grow into adulthood they are prepared
to meet the challenges they will face, and that society will not suffer as a result
of parents’ decisions.
C. The Right to Choose Whether or Not to Have Children Does Not Extend
to the Right to Use Sex and Trait Selection Technologies
The Due Process guarantee of freedom from undue government
interference extends to the decision to have a child without undue interference
from the state.106 In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, a regulation
requiring teachers to take an unpaid mandatory maternity leave four to five
months prior to the anticipated birth of their child violated the teachers’ due
process rights by penalizing teachers for asserting their rights to have
children.107
Privacy rights also include the right to choose measures to not have
children.108 The Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, affirmed a right to be
free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child in Eisenstadt
v. Baird.109 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court, per Justice
Douglas, struck down a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of
contraceptives because the Connecticut regulation unconstitutionally intruded
upon the right of marital privacy.110 Justice Douglas’ plurality opinion focused
on the private nature of the decision to use contraceptives within the sanctity of

106. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (holding that
mandatory school board rules denied the teachers’ due process because the mandatory maternity
leave burdens teachers’ liberty interests by presuming that a teacher who is four or five months
pregnant is physically incapable of performing her duties and provisions furthered no legitimate
state interest); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (affirming that a woman’s
decision to conceive or to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution).
107. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 650 (The school board impinged on teachers’ right to be free from
governmental intrusion on their decision whether or not to have a child.).
108. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (reversing the lower court’s
conviction of a medical director who provided information, instruction and medical advice to
married persons regarding methods of conception).
109. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding a Massachusetts statute that permitted married
persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but prohibited distribution of
contraceptives to single persons for that purpose violated the Equal Protection Clause).
110. 381 U.S. at 485. Justice Douglas did not rely on a specific Amendment for the guarantee
of privacy in this case, but instead discussed specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights which create
zones, or penumbras, of privacy. Id. at 486. The Connecticut law forbidding the use of
contraception unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy. Id. at 486. This right
may be found in first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. Id, at 484-85.
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the marital relationship.111 Affirming Griswold, Justice Brennan’s plurality in
Eisenstadt further refined the boundaries of the realm of personal privacy in
holding that, under the Equal Protection Clause, an individual’s right of
privacy extends to the right for both married and single persons to have access
to contraceptives.112
While privacy rights include the right to choose to use measures to not
have children 113 and the right to have children,114 they do not extend to permit
parents to choose to have children only with special characteristics. The
decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt focused on the personal and intimate
nature of the couple’s private decision to use contraception. The Court
expressed its reluctance to enter a sexually intimate couple’s bedroom, but the
couple breaks their private sphere when it leaves its bedroom to visit a medical
facility in contemplation of using reproductive technologies. Thus, the couple
seeking a child with certain traits should not be afforded the same protection as
a couple who maintains its privacy.
D. The Right to Have an Abortion Does Not Extend to the Right to Use Sex
and Trait Selection Technologies
In 1973, Justice Blackmun’s 7-2 majority opinion in Roe v. Wade first
recognized a woman’s right to elect to have an abortion prior to the viability of
a fetus without undue government interference.115 The Court concluded that
the right of personal privacy includes the right to choose an abortion, but this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests
111. Id. at 485-86. The Court expressed disgust at the nature of enforcement mechanism
which would require entering the marital bedroom. Id. at 485-86. In contrast, regulation of sex
and trait selection would not require entering the marital bedroom. Id. at 485-86. The legislation
would aim at medical facilities, which are the target of substantial regulation to maintain health
and prevent harm.
112. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The Court did not address a person’s right to access
contraceptives themselves. See id. Instead, the Court, in following Griswold, indicated that if
contraceptives are to be accessible to married persons, the same access to contraceptives must be
available to non-married individuals. Id. at 454.
113. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
114. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding a woman’s
fundamental right to privacy encompasses the right to make reproductive decisions, free of
governmental interference, to submit to medical procedures that bring about, rather than prevent,
pregnancy). In Lifchez, the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois struck down an
Illinois law as unconstitutionally vague and violative of fundamental privacy in that it was
unclear whether it made it illegal for couples to submit to medical procedures permitting them to
have children when the couples would otherwise be childless. Id. at 1372-77.
115. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life
becomes a “compelling” interest at viability). In response to a class action, brought by a single
pregnant woman who was denied an abortion, challenging a Texas statute, the Court struck down
the Texas criminal abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except as
medically necessary to save the life of the mother. Id.
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in regulation.116 Further constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to
terminate pregnancy before viability derives from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.117
In determining that this right of personal privacy existed, the Court focused
on the woman’s distress during the pregnancy and in the future, including her
imminent psychological harm, mental and physical health concerns involved
with raising a child, the distress associated with having an unwanted child, the
complications associated with bringing up a child in a family who does not
want or is not prepared for the child, and the stigma found by unwed
mothers.118 While the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty
was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy,” the Court nonetheless placed the “basic
responsibility” for the abortion decision with the physician and characterized
the decision as “inherently, and primarily, a medical decision.”119
In a 7-2 opinion issued with Roe, the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton
struck down a Georgia statute banning abortions except when a pregnancy
would endanger a woman’s life or seriously and permanently injure her health,
the fetus would be “very likely to be born with grave, permanent, and
irremediable mental or physical defect,” or the pregnancy resulted from a
rape.120 As in Roe, the Supreme Court, per Justice Blackmun, recognized that
a pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to abortion on
demand.121 States may, according to the Court, justify an abortion statute

116. Id. at 154. The Court noted that important State interests may include safeguarding
health in maintaining medical standards and protecting potential life. Id. at 154. The State
interests addressed in this opinion are congruent with the interests the State has in regulating
preconception sex and trait selection. Id. at 156. It is clear from this opinion that a person does
not have an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases. Id. The statute in this case
outstripped the state’s justifications and swept beyond any areas of compelling interest. Id.
117. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (affirming
the central holding in Roe, while clarifying the source of the right of personal privacy). In Roe,
the Court indicated that whether or not the right was founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action, it was in the Ninth Amendment’s
reservation of rights to the people. 410 U.S. at 153.
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court specifically disagreed with Petitioner’s argument that
women are entitled to terminate pregnancies without constraints. Id. at 154. In defending a
constitutionally protected “private sphere of individual liberty,” Justice Blackmun stressed the
personal, intimate, private, and individual dignity and autonomy involved in a woman’s decision
to have an abortion. Id. at 192.
119. Id. at 166.
120. 410 U.S. 179, 183, 197-201 (1973). Blackmun’s majority indicated that the woman’s
health includes a consideration of all relevant factors, such as the woman’s physical and
emotional state, familial situation, and the woman’s age. Id. at 192.
121. See id. at 189 (reaffirming Roe). See also id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White, in his dissent in Doe, lamented about the Court’s decision which seemingly valued the
convenience of the pregnant woman over the potential life that she carries. Id. As reproductive
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protecting the interest of embryonic and fetal life.122 Similar to the Court’s
concern in Doe that the government regulates medical procedures associated
with pregnancy, the government has an interest in the use of reproductive
technologies associated with preconception sex and trait selection.
The Constitutional protection afforded to women’s right to abortion
without state interference is not without limits.123 The State has an obligation
to regulate to safeguard health, maintain medical standards, and protect
potential life.124
The plurality opinion in Casey quoted the majority in Roe for the
proposition that while the decision to have an abortion “is more than a
philosophical exercise,” it is also conduct “fraught with consequences for
others.”125 The state may assert its interest in potential life throughout
Casey also stands for the proposition that stated that
pregnancy.126
“[r]eproductive decisions affect offspring and may lead directly to burdens” on
third parties.127 While there have been few efforts to ensure reproductive
responsibility and the notion of reproductive responsibility has not been
addressed in countries without population problems, innovations in
reproductive technology will force individuals and the legislature to consider
issues of reproductive responsibility.128
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a plurality defined “fundamental” rights as
those rights which have traditionally been protected by the court.129 The right

technologies such as preconception sex selection become available, the need to halt the slippery
slope into unrestricted reproductive health that began with Roe is evident. Id.
122. Id. at 190-91.
123. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). See also
Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 133 (1992)
(discussing the Court’s decisions subsequent to Roe which permit a wide range of restrictions on
access to abortion prior to viability).
124. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. According to the Court, the others are “the persons who perform
and assist in the procedure . . . the spouse, family, and society which must confront the
knowledge that these procedures exist . . . and depending on one’s beliefs . . . the life or potential
life that is aborted.” Id. See McClain, supra note 123, at 139 (indicating that this point is where
tension arises between a woman’s liberty and the state’s interest in potential life).
126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
127. Robertson, supra note 49, at 251.
128. Id.
129. 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989). Not all sexual conduct is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. The Court in Michael H. rejected an adulterous natural father’s claim that
he had a due process right to maintain a paternal relationship with the child. Id. at 122-27. Under
California law, the mother’s husband who was living with her at the time of the child’s birth was
presumed to be the child’s father. Id. at 117-18. The Court halted before expanding the contours
of due process to protect men who sire children. See id. at 122-27. California’s presumption that
the mother’s husband was the father’s child protected higher values than those inherent in
recognizing the rights of the biological father. Id. at 122-23. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
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to have an abortion is limited by medical and social interests.130 While
protecting the rights of women deciding whether or not to bear a child, the
Court recognized that a woman’s choice bears consequences for others which
may be significant. Any right a woman has to terminate her pregnancy relies
on the consequences the act may have on herself and others.131
No right exists “to enter the commerce of reproduction . . . because such
activities do not implicate private relationships.”132 Preconception sex and trait
selection clearly does not fall within the realm of rights traditionally protected
by the court as fundamental rights. The composition of families has rapidly
evolved in the past couple decades, but the law does not protect the majority of
these changes.133 The Court will uphold laws prohibiting or restricting the use
of these reproductive technologies by applying a rational basis review.
In Casey, the Supreme Court affirmed Roe in a joint opinion, where the
Court’s plurality held that a woman is afforded a constitutional right to obtain
an abortion prior to viability without undue interference from the state.134 The
Supreme Court also recognized, “the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.”135

U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy laws while denying the argument that
homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right deserving of constitutional protection).
130. See Hogsdon v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990) (upholding a state requirement
that a minor wait forty-eight hours after notifying a single parent of her intention to get an
abortion). Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion agreed with the state that this restriction on
abortion furthered the State’s legitimate interest in ensuring that the minor’s decision is knowing
and intelligent. Id. at 448. In reaching its decision, the Court explained that the time provided the
parents with the opportunity to ensure that the doctor performing the abortion was qualified and
to discuss the moral implications with their daughter who seeks an abortion. Id. at 448-49. The
State has an interest in ensuring the welfare of the minor undergoing the abortion. Id.
131. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
132. See Rao, supra note 64, at 1079. Rao refers to all “new” reproductive technologies,
including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, sperm donations, embryo donations, and
surrogacy. Id. Some lower courts have upheld decisions prohibiting parents from paying for the
adoption or surrogacy of children. Id. For instance, in Doe v. Kelley, the Michigan appellate
court held that the parents’ fundamental right to have a child is not impinged on by state laws
making it illegal to pay consideration to adopt a child or to have another woman carry the child
during pregnancy. 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
133. For example, families may presently incorporate homosexual couples, surrogate parents,
babies born with the eggs or sperm of third parties, divorced parents, and single parents.
134. 505 U.S. at 846 (examining the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statue which required
minors to notify their parents prior to obtaining an abortion and required wives to notify their
husband’s prior to abortion).
135. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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Interpreting Roe, the Supreme Court, in Maher v. Roe, clarified that an
unqualified constitutional right to have an abortion does not exist.136 Maher
stated that “[a] pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right
to have an abortion on her demand.”137 While the right to have an abortion is
protected by a general right of privacy and as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest, the right to have an abortion is not without limits and is afforded less
protection than some constitutional rights, such as the right to free speech.138
Further, the Constitution does not prohibit a state or city from expressing a
preference for “normal” childbirth.139
In order “[t]o protect the central right recognized in Roe v. Wade while at
the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in potential life,”
the Court employed an undue burden analysis.140 “An undue burden exists,
and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”141
The rationale behind the constitutional protection afforded to a woman’s
right to elect to have an abortion under certain circumstances is that
considering a woman’s education, employment skills, financial resources, and
emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome
for a woman.142 The Supreme Court explained that a pregnant woman’s
suffering is “too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more,
136. 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977). See also Planned Parenthood Ass’n of the Atlanta Area,
Inc. v. Harris, 670 F. Supp. 971, 983-85 (N.D. Ga. 1987). The Court, in Harris, held that the
state has a legitimate interest in promoting parental consultation with a minor who is seeking
abortion because of the minor’s presumed inability to make important decisions in an informed,
mature manner, and serious concerns implicated by decision to have an abortion. Id. A statute
requiring a minor to notify her parents prior to aborting a fetus can satisfy due process if it is
narrowly tailored to promote the state’s significant interests. Id. In this case, Georgia’s broad
statute violated due process. Id.
137. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973).
138. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993). “Abortion clinics
and abortion rights organizations applied for permanent injunction to enjoin anti-abortion
organization and members from trespassing on, impeding, or obstructing ingress to or egress from
facilities providing abortion services and related counseling.” Id. The Supreme Court, per Justice
Scalia, held that the goal of preventing abortion does not qualify as an invidiously discriminatory
animus directed at women in general, and an anti-abortion demonstration’s incidental effect on
some women’s right to interstate travel did not suffice to show conspiracy to deprive those
women of their protected interstate travel right. Id.
139. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989). See also Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) (involving the situation in which the government expresses a preference
in funding childbirth).
140. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court, per Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, abandoned the “strict
scrutiny” standard. Id. The very notion that the state has a substantial interest in potential life
leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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upon its own vision of [a] woman’s role.”143 Casey links reproductive choice
to a woman’s existential decisions, her spirituality and her personhood. 144
The state interests are not strong enough to support the prohibition of
abortion or interference with the women’s election to obtain an abortion prior
to viability.145 However, the Court has upheld a state’s power to restrict a
woman’s decision to elect to have an abortion after fetal viability, “if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or
health.”146 According to the Court, the state has “legitimate interests from the
[onset] of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of
the fetus that may become a child.”147
E.

Constitutional Protection of Family and Reproductive Decisions Does not
Extend to Sex and Trait Selection

Supporters of preconception sex selection argue that the right to choose the
sex and characteristics of offspring should be based on an extension of the
constitutional protection afforded to individual’s rights to make personal
decisions in the areas of conception, pregnancy, child rearing and family.148
Individual rights to make decisions concerning family, children, and
procreation have traditionally found protection in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and constitutional guarantees of privacy.149 The
values implicated, traditional reproduction and conception matters, are not
present with sex and trait selection. While the government permits individuals
to make family and reproductive decisions, the government limits the
necessary medical procedures to ensure the health.

143. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (commenting on the sacrifices involved with child bearing that
women have made throughout the centuries).
144. See McClain, supra note 123, at 140.
145. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (affirming the core of Roe).
146. Id.
147. Id. See also Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403-04 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to
address whether a woman’s relationship with her unborn child during pregnancy is a fundamental
interest). In Alexander, a mother whose child was stillborn challenged the constitutionality of a
New Jersey wrongful death and survival statute that denied recovery on behalf of stillborn
fetuses. Id. at 1396-97. Petitioner claimed to have a fundamental liberty interest in her
relationship with the unborn child. Id. at 1402-03. Using a rational basis review because a
fundamental right was not implicated, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the mother’s
due process rights were not violated by the New Jersey legislation. Id. at 1404-06.
148. Danis, supra note 12.
149. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that although the Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the Court has continually recognized a right of
personal privacy).
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Government Funding Should not be Wasted on the Use of Reproductive
Technology to Select the Traits or Sex of Offspring

Even if Congress and the states are constitutionally prohibited from
enacting legislation to restrain parents from selecting the sex and
characteristics of their offspring, the federal and state governments are under
no obligation to fund these detrimental uses of reproductive technologies. The
commercialization of reproduction diverts medical resources away from more
medically necessary research and treatment.150
If laws are not implemented denying parents’ power to select their
childrens sex and traits according to their whims, Congress and state
legislatures should deny any funding for these reproductive technologies.151
States are not required to fund contraception or a woman’s right to elect an
abortion, even though these activities are protected from state interference. In
Maher v. Roe, the Court upheld a state welfare regulation under which
Medicaid recipients received payments for services related to childbirth, but
not for non-therapeutic abortions.152 The state imposed restrictions did not
impinge upon a woman’s right of privacy on the ground that Roe did not
prevent a state from making a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion
and implementing that judgment by the allocation of public funds.153 Webster

150. See Laura Shanner & Jeffrey Niskee, Bioethics for Clinicians; 26 Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 64 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1589, 1591 (2001) (lamenting about the way the sale of
pregnancy, gametes, and embryos in assisted reproductive technologies take advantage of lower
class women who are paid for their reproductive abilities while the sale of human tissues is
strictly prohibited). Research of the long-term affects of reproductive technologies remains to be
done, so the consequences are uncertain.
151. Considering the present cost of reproductive technologies to select a child’s sex, it is
likely that issues concerning the funding of these procedures will be an issue. The entire in vitro
process must be carried out at least twice prior to the preimplantation genetic diagnosis, at a cost
starting at $11,000 per cycle. See Faith Lagay, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, VIRTUAL
MENTOR (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/5717.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2002).
152. 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (applying a less demanding test of rationality to uphold a
statute which provided funding for childbirth but not for non-therapeutic abortions). Accord Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding by a 6-3 majority that a Pennsylvania statute limiting the
funding of abortion to Medicaid-eligible women to abortions which threaten the woman’s health
or when the infant may be born with an incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency).
153. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-94 (1991). In Rust, the Supreme Court upheld a
regulatory scheme under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, which prohibited the use of
Title X funds for abortion counseling, referral and provision of information regarding abortion as
a method of family planning. Id. at 201-02. According to the Court, the state’s decision to
provide funding for live births, but not abortion, did not violate Title X recipients’ Fifth
Amendment rights to choose to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 201. Recipients of family planning
funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act and doctors who administered Title X funds
challenged the funding provisions which construed non-therapeutic abortions as beyond “family
planning” with the meaning of the statute. Id. at 179. The majority emphasized that the
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v. Reproductive Services upheld a prohibition on the use of public facilities for
medical personnel for providing abortions, even if a woman’s own physician
plans to perform the abortion.154 In a 6-3 ruling, the Court in Maher
distinguished between direct state interference with protected activities and
state encouragement of an alternative activity consistent with legislative
policy.155
The Supreme Court reached an analogous result in Harris v. McRae, a 5-4
decision which upheld the validity of the Hyde Amendment, a state regulation
which severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of
abortions under the Medicaid program.156 Justice Stewart’s majority opinion
focused on the fact that the state’s decision not to fund non-medically
necessary abortions placed no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman
who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.157 Maher, Poelker, and McRae all

government has no duty to subsidize an activity merely because it is constitutionally protected.
Id. at 201. The government, according to the majority, may validly choose to allocate public
funds for medical services relating to child birth but not to abortion. Id. at 201-02. See Beal, 432
U.S. at 445-46 (holding that the Social Security Act did not require the funding of nontherapeutic
abortions as a condition of participation in the Medicaid program; reaffirming the policy that the
state has an important interest in encouraging childbirth, but that interest does not become
sufficiently compelling until the third trimester to justify unduly burdensome state interference
with the woman’s constitutionally protected privacy interest).
154. 492 U.S. 490, 509-11 (1989).
155. 432 U.S. at 475. The State has a broad power to encourage actions deemed to be in the
public interest. The Court sustained the Connecticut funding scheme which prohibited Social
Security funding for non-medically necessary abortions. Id. at 478. Connecticut’s distinction
between childbirth and non-therapeutic abortion by the regulation was “rationally related” to a
“constitutionally permissible” purpose. Id. The Court relied on Roe’s acknowledgement of the
State’s strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. Id.
156. 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1990) (holding that federal restrictions on the funding of abortions by
states participating in the Medicaid program obligated under Title XIX of the Social Security Act
to continue to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal funding was
unavailable under the Hyde Amendment were constitutional, as these provisions meet the
“rational relation to the state interest” standard). See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533 (2001). The Court, discussing Rust, held that a restriction prohibiting local recipients of
Legal Services Corporation funds from engaging in representation to involving efforts to amend
or challenge the validity of current welfare laws was an impermissible violation of First
Amendment free speech. Id. at 545. The Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, interpreted Rust not
as singling out abortion for suppression when denying funding for abortion counseling, but
considered abortion as outside the scope of the project and therefore ineligible for funding. Id. at
540-41. After Velazquez, state regulations imposing restrictions on funding of preconception sex
and trait selection need to be carefully considered to avoid the statues being struck down later as
violating free speech.
157. Harris, 448 U.S. at 315 (holding that a woman’s freedom of choice does not carry with it
a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the protected resources).
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support the view that the state should not commit any resources to facilitating
abortions, even if it can turn a profit by doing so.158
Persons seeking to realize the advantages of fundamental liberty interests
are not entitled to government funding to take advantage of those rights.159
Even if a legislative scheme is not adopted which will prohibit the use of
reproductive technologies to select the sex or characteristics of one’s offspring
prior to conception, funding schemes should not be implemented that would
support the use of these reproductive technologies. Government funding needs
to be used for essential medical care and research, instead of being wasted on
research, development, or utilization of preconception offspring selection.
III. HARMS ASSOCIATED WITH PRECONCEPTION SEX AND TRAIT SELECTION
DEMAND REGULATION
Where fundamental rights or interests are not implicated or infringed,
courts review state statutes under a rational relations basis test, under which the
statute withstands the due process challenge if the state identifies a legitimate
state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the
statute.160
Congress has not yet decided where to draw the line around reproductive
rights. The policy reasons for protecting reproductive freedoms should not
extend to the use of reproductive technologies to design the sex and
characteristics of offspring. While the right not to have a child has been
established, no right has been established for parents to have children with
certain characteristics. This right, therefore, should not extend to the right to
have a child with certain characteristics.
Prebirth selection of offspring characteristics is not constitutional on the
grounds that it bears a connection with the expected characteristics of the
158. Webster, 492 U.S. at 511. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 464. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519, 524-25 (1977) (holding that no constitutional violation exists if a state provides public
funds for hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions).
159. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) (holding that regulations of the
Department of Health and Human Services prohibiting recipients of funds under Title X of the
Public Health Service Act from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and activities
advocating abortion as a method of family planning do not violate a woman’s Fifth Amendment
right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy); Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-18. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Rust elaborated that the government’s failure to fund abortions
does not place an obstacle in the place of a woman seeking an abortion. 500 U.S. at 201-02.
Instead, the lack of funding places the woman in the same place she would be in if the
government decided not to fund family planning activities at all. Id. See also Maher, 432 U.S. at
464 (holding that the state’s refusal to fund abortions does not violate Roe v. Wade).
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955)) (upholding an Oklahoma state regulation of
visual care on the basis that an evil was present and the legislation was a rational way to correct
the evil).
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offspring, but may be constitutional based on the connection with the decision
whether or not to reproduce.161 It is unconstitutional and unacceptable to
decide whether or not to have a child based upon the child’s characteristics or
sex.162 The law recognizes certain reproductive rights which are protected
from interference, but preconception sex and trait selection are not within these
rights.
Since the use of preconception sex and trait selection technologies should
not be considered a fundamental liberty right protected by constitutional
guarantees of due process nor by constitutional guarantees of privacy,
regulation in this area will only have to pass a “rational basis” test. The
potential harmful consequences of the use of this technology to the children
themselves and society in general are sufficiently substantial to meet this
criterion.
New reproductive technologies present society with remarkable
possibilities for manipulating practically every aspect of human
reproduction.163 As a result, they disrupt deeply embedded expectations about
the ordering of family relationships.164 Parents now have the option not only
whether or not to have children and when to have them, but how to conceive
them and even how to design them.165 Lawmakers should not fall under the
illusion that changes in reproductive technologies can be accommodated within
our familiar understandings of families.166 The potential harms implicated by
parents’ use of reproductive technologies to select the sex and traits of their
offspring justify regulation.
A.

Interests of the Potential Children Demand Regulation

The potential harm to children justifies regulation over preconception sex
and trait selection, whether courts use the strict scrutiny or the rational
relations standard. Interests of unborn children have also been recognized in
certain situations.167 The state unquestionably has a “strong and legitimate
161. Robertson, supra note 6, at 425.
162. But see id. at 425-31. Drawing the line between protected and unprotected traits and
methods is likely to be difficult to draw. Id.
163. Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New
Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 501 (1997). Contra Joseph Fletcher, THE
ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING GENETIC ROULETTE 128 (1974) (discrediting the doubt
as unobjective and without reasoning that the use of reproductive technology is disrespectful to
human life if humans presume to be so arrogant as to exert control over the sources of life).
164. Dolgin, supra note 163, at 501.
165. Id. at 501-02.
166. Id. at 502 (suggesting that the use of reproductive technologies influences not only the
way society views children, but also the way society views marriage and families in general).
167. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159, 162-63 (1973) (acknowledging a state’s interest in
protecting the potential life of a fetus after viability). In Roe, the Court stated that because a
pregnant woman carries a potential human being she “cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . [Her]

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

548

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:517

interest in encouraging normal childbirth.”168 Children genetically altered and
chosen by the parents’ whims cannot be considered children brought into the
world through “normal childbirth.” Further, the government has the power to
secure the health of children against “impeding restraints and dangers.”169
The potential psychological and biological affects on children produced by
the use of sex selection technology may be devastating.170 For many parents,
the birth of a child of the desired or unwanted sex (usually female) engenders
happiness or unhappiness for the parents.171 Parents often hope their children
will follow and exceed their own footsteps. This can lead to extreme pressures
on children to fulfill their parents’ dreams. Children who know that they
reflect the sex or characteristics that their parents choose may suffer from a
damaging loss of self-esteem.172

privacy is no longer sole and any right she possesses must be measured accordingly.” Id. A
woman’s right of privacy in relation to an abortion is inherently different from marital intimacy,
or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education. Id. The
woman’s rights must be considered in lieu of the potential life growing inside the woman. Id.
While the Court explicitly denied any legal rights of the unborn child, the Court took the wellbeing of this potential life into account during it’s deliberation. Id.
168. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977) (recognizing the state’s interest in the unborn
child throughout the woman’s pregnancy).
169. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (referring specifically to the evils of
child labor). The Court stated that a democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the health
and well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens. Id. It is well within the
State’s police power to enact legislation to prevent these evils from corrupting children, who will
be tomorrow’s citizens. See id. at 168-69. See also Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King’s County Hosp.,
278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (holding that the state is
justified, over parents’ objections on religious grounds, to request court-ordered blood
transfusions for children in need of the transfusions). While parents are generally presumed to act
in the best interests of their children, parents decisions do not always reflect the best interest of
the child, thus requiring court interference. Id. The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose child to ill health or death. Id. Parents are unlikely to realize the realm
of harms that may result from their decision to select the sex or characteristics of one’s children.
Once the decision is made, however, it is impossible for parents to stop the harmful
consequences.
170. See Shanner & Niskee, supra note 150, at 1589-94 (indicating that the long-term psychosocial implications of most assisted reproductive technologies remains incomplete).
171. Macnaughton, supra note 16, at 48 (discussing the reasons parents may use sex selection
reproductive technologies). See also Greg Swift, We Gave Up on Our Test Tube Baby, THE
EXPRESS, Mar. 5, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 14336758 (telling the story of a couple who
was outraged and disappointed when their efforts to obtain a female embryo failed, resulting in
the pregnancy of a male child).
172. Mary Anne Warren, Reproductive Technology & Women, in THE ETHICS OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 239 (1992) (focusing on the damaging effects of sex pre-selection
on females).
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Parents who focus on having a “designer” child are not prepared for the
unconditional love and acceptance essential for parenting.173 Parents with the
attitude that their child may be designed to fit ideal specifications may be
disappointed or feel guilty if their child does not live up to their expectations or
if the child is born with a birth defect.174
B.

The Protection of Individuality Demands Regulation

At the heart of the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.175 A person’s interest in defining
one’s own destiny is violated if one’s parents are allowed to select the
individual’s sex or characteristics.176
It does not follow from Supreme Court decisions protecting contraception
and child rearing decisions that prebirth control over offspring traits and
characteristics follow those rights.177 Unlike abortion and contraception
decisions which result in a child’s existence or non-existence, preconception
selection is a method of exhibiting extreme control over a child’s destiny.
Constitutionally protected upbringing decisions of parents do not broach this
level of control over their children’s lives.
Parents’ interests in the care and upbringing of their children is limited in
some respects by the best interests of their children.178 Certain rights of

173. See Remaley, supra note 20, at 270. Remaley is concerned that permitting parents to
select “designer children” will sacrifice qualities inherent in the parent-child relationship. Id. By
validating inappropriate notions of parenthood, the parent-child relationship will be harmed by
parents’ expectations of the ideal child. Id. at 270. The child, while selected for certain traits, is
set up for perfection, thus setting the child up for feelings of failure with any imperfection. Id.
174. Id. (quoting the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research).
175. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
176. See Lagay, supra note 151 (citing D.S. King, Preimplanation Genetic Diagnosis and the
“New” Eugenics, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 182 (1999)). In a discussion of the potential
application of preimplantation diagnosis to permit parents to select the traits of their children,
Lagay expresses her concerns that the “chosen child” faces a determinism more forceful and rigid
than genes. Id. The child faces parental determinism that the child fulfill the intention or talent
or skills the child was selected to embody. Id.
177. But see Robertson, supra note 6, at 427 (arguing that reproduction is a fundamental right
and prebirth selection of offspring characteristics deserves the same protection). While certain
decisions have offered protection for the right not to have children and the right to have children,
the issues and policies behind these decisions are not relevant to the right to have offspring with
certain characteristics.
178. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky. 1992) (following Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)) (holding that grandparent visitation statute did not violate fundamental rights of
parents in consideration of the best interests of the child). In King, the court stated:
While the Constitution, as interpreted by various courts, does recognize the right to rear
children without undue governmental interference, that right is not inviolate. Parents are
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unborn children are afforded protection.179 Protection of a woman’s right to
have an abortion that is not medically necessary may be outweighed when the
fetus is viable.180 Since a state may justify a statute restricting abortion as
supporting the state’s interest in protection of embryonic and fetal life,181 this
suggests that that government may, under certain circumstances, seek to
protect children prior to their conception.
Further, parental selection of children’s sex could jeopardize their
children’s individuality.182 America’s emphasis on individuality is based
partially on one’s unique genetic heritage.183 As a result, some view the
manipulation of genetic structures as a threat to individual identity of future
children.184 The use of genetic information prior to birth to shape an
offspring’s characteristics contradicts American ethics dedication to the dignity
and worth of each individual.185 This unprecedented exercise of control over
the lives of one’s children is an unacceptable harm justifying government
regulation.186

required by law to see that their children are educated. Children must be inoculated
against disease. Parents cannot abuse their children. Severe restrictions are placed upon
the employment of children. Children must be restrained when riding in a motor vehicle.
Thus, over the years, there has been increased legislation guaranteeing the safety,
education, and the physical and emotional welfare of the children.
Id.
179. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (noting that one of the dimensions of the protection of a
woman’s right to have an abortion is the cruelness that may result to a child born to parents who
do not want nor have the resources to care for the child).
180. Id. at 860.
181. See supra note 136. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 190-191 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 875. The Supreme Court rejected the
trimester framework it established in Roe because the practical effect of this framework was that
it undervalued the State’s interest protecting the fetal life or potential life within the woman. Id.
Roe and Casey established the State’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life.” Id.
182. Further, children created based upon their parent’s whims may lose their sense of being a
“unique and intrinsically valuable entity.” See also Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment
and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 618,
648 (1973).
183. Since similar traits are valued by the majority of persons, the use of sex and trait
selection technologies may result in children who are quite similar to one another, thus reducing
each individual’s unique qualities.
184. Priest, supra note 14, at 80-82. See also Beth Foraker, Editorial, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8,
2000, at 6, available at 2000 WL 6493534.
185. Robertson, supra note 6, at 422.
186. Id. at 423.
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C. The Harms Associated with a Gender Imbalance in the Population
Demands Regulation
Another detrimental ramification of unrestricted use of reproductive
technologies for preconception sex selection is the likelihood that a gender
imbalance in the population will result. The preference for male children
persists in most parts of the world.187 In Asian countries where the birth of a
male child is preferred over the birth of a female child, parents go to extreme
measures to obtain a male child,188 and the gender balance in the population is
evident.189 Studies suggest that if women in America were allowed to select
the sex of their children, they would choose 161 boys for every 100 girls.190
The historical quest for male offspring reflects the notions across societies that
maleness is a form of social, political, and economic entitlement.191
Proponents of this use of reproductive technology argue that couples who
have one or more children of a certain sex may be interested in having a child
of the other sex, so sex selection will be used in these cases to even out a sex
imbalance in families.192 The technology will be an attractive option for
couples in cultures where one sex carriers a higher status than the other sex.193

187. ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNING BABIES: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY 166 (1999).
188. Mona Charen, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at A16 (addressing the infanticide of female
children in these countries).
189. See id. (reporting that in India, infanticide and abortion of female fetuses resulted in a
gender imbalance of 40 million more men than women). See also Celia W. Dugger, Modern
Asia’s Anomaly: The Girls Who Don’t Get Born, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2001, § 4 at 4 (commenting
on the effect of sex-selective abortions in China and India, particularly that the ratio of girls to
boys from birth to age six has dropped sharply in India). In China, the one child per family
policy has resulted in the infanticide of an estimated ten million to twenty million female babies.
Id. Ninety percent of the children in Chinese orphanages are female babies whose parents have
abandoned the infant girls in hopes of obtaining a male baby. Id.
190. Remaley, supra note 20, at 275-77. Remaley indicates that parents are likely to select
males as their firstborn children, thus denying females of benefits associated with being the
firstborn child. Id.
191. Danis, supra note 12 (noting the historical and cross-cultural efforts to ensure the birth of
a male offspring). See also EDWARD YOXEN, UNNATURAL SELECTION 137-73 (1986)
(suggesting that sex selection will lead not to a significant sex imbalance in the population, but to
a society of first-born males).
192. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OUR GENETIC FUTURE: THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF
GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 197 (1992). In 1990, Barroness Mary Warnock caused a furor when she
expressed criticisms of sex selection based on the premise that this technique could be used to
maintain class distinctions by allowing male heirs to continue family lines. SUSAN MERRILL
SQUIER, BABIES IN BOTTLES: TWENTIETH-CENTURY VISIONS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
100 (1994).
193. SQUIER, supra note 192, at 100.
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The devastating consequences of a gender imbalance justifies law prohibiting
the use of sex selection reproductive technologies.194
D. The Violation of Women’s Rights Because Sex-Selection is Discriminatory
Towards Women Demands Regulation.
Sex selection should be prohibited because it potentially discriminates
against women.195 The British Medical Association rejects permitting parents
to use medical advances to select the sex of their children because it will
increase sexual discrimination.196 At the very least, sex selection violates a
principal of equality between females and males and the psychological
importance to parenting of unconditional acceptance of a child.197 The
discriminatory effect of selecting one sex over the other prior to conception is
determintal to children’s self-esteem and well-being. If the child born is not
the desired sex, the child is likely to feel hurt and suffer from low self-esteem.
E.

Alteration of Natural Selection Resulting in a Loss of Genetic Diversity
Demands Regulation.

Human characteristics evolved over thousands, possibly even millions of
years to result in the current range of traits, behaviors, and physical features
currently evident in people world wide.198 Genetic alterations will lead to a
loss of genetic diversity.199 Genetic diversity helps species survive the hazards
194. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING GENETIC
ROULETTE 128 (1974). For example, a gender imbalance will make it substantially more difficult
for one sex to obtain mates. See generally Helen Bequaert Holmes, Choosing Children’s Sex:
Challenges to Feminist Ethics, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 148 (Joan C. Callahan
ed., 1995) (applying feminist perspectives to oppose sex selection because it reflects the
American patriarchal society in which maleness is equated with superiority and happiness).
BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192 (condemning the abortion of fetuses based on
their sex alone, but has yet to express an opinion on pre-conception sex-selection).
195. Macnaughton, supra note 16, at 48 (arguing that sex selection for social reasons should
not be permitted because it is discriminatory and conflicts with societal ethical values). See Greg
Freeman, Mother Nature, Not Moms and Dads, Should Pick Child’s Gender, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2002, at C3. Missouri State Representative Michael Reid’s felt that nature, not
parents, should pick children’s sex. Id. Reid is concerned about discrimination against human
embryos prior to transplantation, based on the embryo’s gender. Id.
196. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 209.
197. See Morgan, supra note 41, at 74.
198. See generally 21 CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN
RELATION TO SEX (Paul H. Barrett & Toby Linden eds., 1989).
199. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 156-57; Damewood, supra note 4
(expressing concerns that the use of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to select the sex or
specific traits of one’s children could threaten innate human diversity). Some legal scholars argue
that when considering legislative prohibitions on reproductive technologies, concerns regarding
decreasing the gene pools so that genetic diversity that is curtailed can easily be characterized as a
legitimate state interest in public health—typically a compelling state interest. See also June
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of a changing environment, such as climate changes and pathogen
resistance.200 This is especially important in an environment such as our own
in which environmental and pathogenic conditions are constantly changing.
When considering legislative prohibitions on reproductive technologies,
concerns regarding decreasing the gene pools and curtailing genetic diversity
can be characterized as a legitimate state interest in public health—typically a
compelling state interest.201
Sex and trait selection may be equated with a form of eugenics reflective
of the practices represented in Nazi Germany or Huxley’s New World.202 This
argument becomes particularly compelling in view of the “slippery slope”
argument that if parents are allowed to select the sex of their children, parents
will soon be permitted to select virtually every aspect of their offspring.203 By
allowing parents to select the sex and other characteristics of their offspring,
science is permitting parents to play a potentially dangerous role in genetic
Coleman, Comment, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis of State Laws
Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1346-48 (1996) (expressing grave
concerns that parents might use the preconception sex selection process to select male children,
which could ultimately lead to the extinction of humanity).
200. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 157 (indicating that species with
diverse gene pools are more likely to overcome adverse circumstances because it is likely that
some organisms which can overcome the unfavorable environment).
201. See Coleman, supra note 199, at 1346-48. In an analysis of a variety of embryological
research procedures, Coleman hesitates to adamantly oppose reproductive technologies based on
this fear. Id.
202. Danis, supra note 12, at 241 (indicating that a contrary view point is that “positive”
eugenics should be distinguished from “negative” eugenics). See Tabitha M. Powledge, Toward
a Moral Policy for Sex Choice, in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN 201, 204-06 (Neil G. Bennett
ed., 1983); Mark I. Evans et. al., Attitudes on the Ethics of Abortion, Sex Selection, and Selective
Pregnancy Termination Among Health Care Professionals, Ethicists, and Clergy Likely to
Encounter Such Situations, 164 AM. J. OBST. GYNECOL 1092, 1098 (1991); Plato, The Republic,
in THE PORTABLE PLATO 469-73 (1986) (discussing the notion that if only those with the highest
intellectual capacity and physical abilities in a society were permitted to reproduce, the preference
would result in a superior society). See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD
(1932); CHARLOTTE HALDANE, MAN’S WORLD (1927) (portraying a society organized around
prenatal sex selection in which woman are reduced to biology, categorized by their reproductive
and sexual roles, and ruled by a coterie of racist white male scientists through a network of
cybernetic surveillance and biological controls). While this argument may, at first glance, appear
extreme when compared with the sterilization methods used by Hitler to further the goals of the
“purification” of the Aryan race, notions of improving the human race through selective breeding
has been supported by some since, at least, the time of Plato’s Republic and is continually met
with fears that some will be excluded from the reproductive process.
203. Danis, supra note 12, at 241-42 (noting that because sex is analogous to these latter
attribute genes, the advent of sex selection forbodes widespread genetic manipulation for the
mere fulfillment of parents’ personal preferences). See also David S. King, Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis and the “New” Eugenics, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 181 (1999) (worrying about
“opening the human gene pool to the winds of social market forces,” that is transient, culturally
influences concepts of the ideal or perfect person).
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alteration. Parents are likely to choose the traits which their culture deems
preferable, but which may not necessarily be the most valuable to their child’s
health or survival or to the continuation of human kind.204 Further, since the
same sex (male) and characteristics (intelligence, kindness, athletic ability and
physical attractiveness) are valued cross-culturally, long-term use of genetic
selection may lead to a genetically homogenous environment, thus making
humans more susceptible to diseases and environmental changes and other
potential unknown consequences. New genetic technologies need to be dealt
with carefully because they could permanently and irreversibly alter the
biology of life forms, the ecology, and natural evolution.205
F.

If Preconception Sex and Trait Selection is Permitted, Children Will
Suffer by Being Viewed as Commercial Products.

Many people object to reducing children to consumer products, and
doctors warn against using this invalidated medical technology for purely
social reasons.206 Sex selection is objectionable on the moral and ethical
principles that sex and characteristics such as hair color, intelligence, or
athletic ability are not the proper criteria for choosing children.207 Parents need
to value their children for the child’s sake and not for the child’s sex, and
permitting parents to engineer their offspring will commodify children.208
Modern reproductive technologies are a source of concern in our
consumer-oriented society.209 Fears exist that parents will think of the child204. But see Jones, supra note 4, at 202-07 (proposing that the use of trait selection
technologies is itself an exhibition of inclusive fitness, thus permitting the “fittest” of the present
world to reproduce).
205. See also MICHAEL W. FOX, BEYOND EVOLUTION 157 (1999) (discussing the potential
harmful ramifications of unregulated genetic engineering technologies; noting that the upheaval
of the natural selection process by the raising of genetically altered crops has a more devastating
effect on wildlife than conventionally and organically raised crops).
206. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 192, at 197 (indicating that the use of
science to allow parents to select children with particular traits, such as sex, physical, emotional,
and intellectual attributes, is unacceptable).
207. See Maria Dolanska & Donald Evans, Patient Perceptions of Assisted Conception
Services, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED
PROCREATION (Donald Evans ed., 1996).
208. See Vicki G. Norton, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic
Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1598-99 (1994) (discussing
potential for abuse of nontherapeutic preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the ethical objections
to the techniques). Norton’s focus is on the prescreening of embryos for certain traits, but the
most recent technology does not even necessitate the creation of an embryo to select a baby’s sex.
209. GOSDEN, supra note 30, at 232 (discussing the damaging effects of commodification to
children created through the use of reproductive technologies, specifically when parents purchase
celebrity sperm and eggs at overpriced rates to produce “designer” children). See Doe v. Att’y
Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). In Doe, the court upheld a Michigan statute that
outlawed paid surrogacy. Id. at 488. The court conceded that the statute encroached upon the
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to-be as more of a fashion object—the designer baby—than a unique human
being with it’s own needs. Parents who are disappointed because sex selection
techniques failed for them may take their disappointment out on their child.210
In the line of cases recognizing parental decision making rights at the
expense of the rights of potential offspring, the interests of potential children
do not risk degraded children in the same manner inherently involved with
preconception sex and trait selection. Concepts of children seem to be based
on the notion that children are the property of their parents.211 Children
produced pursuant to their parents’ genetic specifications might enjoy high
social status as a result of these characteristics.212 As these children become
highly valued, children who are not genetically altered will become
undervalued.213
constitutionally protected zone of privacy, which guarantees “freedom from government
interference in matters of marriage, family, procreation, and intimate associations.” Id. at 487.
The court concluded that given the state’s compelling interests to warrant intrusion into the area
of procreation generally protected by privacy, the statute should be upheld. Id. at 487-88. The
court found a compelling state interest in protecting the best interests of the children by
preventing them from becoming commodities and precluding the exploitation of women. Id. at
486-87.
210. GOSDEN, supra note 31, at 175. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Surrogacy Legislation in
California: Legislative Regulation of Surrogacy and Reproductive Technology, 28 U.S.F. L. REV.
613, 617-18 (1994). According to Shultz, money is a proxy for other questions and
consequences–the allocation of power and agency, the appropriateness of bargaining and
enforcement models in family life, and the fear of treating persons as objects. Id. at 618. People
of color as well as economically powerless individuals often find themselves being abused with
the justification that this abuse is based on “the market.” See id. The commodification and
commercialization of intimate life is a core concern. FOX, supra note 204, at 211-18 (lamenting
about the greed present in humans today and the lack of reverence for nature). Fox suggests that
humans now aim to control and manipulate life around them, while lacking wisdom and ethical
responsibility. Id. Human beings are playing God. Id.
211. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1810 (1993) (arguing that children are seen as
private, not public property, which are subject to their parent’s successes and weaknesses).
212. Danis, supra note 12, at 236. The high cost of eugenic procedures might result in a
lower class of genetically “imperfect” persons. Id. at 236-37. The advent of sex selection
forbodes widespread genetic manipulation of the fulfillment of mere preference. Id. Women are
likely to suffer as a result of being the less selected sex. Id. Parents would select male children
more often than female children, and they would select male children to be first born offspring
(thus permitting males to benefit from the advantages of being first born children). Id. Males,
through their greater numbers, would know that they were selected more often and were thus
more desired, increasing their sense of self-worth and self-importance while diminishing the selfesteem of their younger sisters or other women. Id.
213. Danis, supra note 12, at 242 (indicating that children created through these reproductive
mechanisms may experience a loss of “selfhood” and they realize that they are genetically
fabricated to another’s design). See also Coleman, supra note 199, at 1351 (arguing that abuse of
reproductive technologies could include discrimination against those not genetically engineered
and those who do not get to select the preferred traits). Shultz, supra note 210, at 618 (addresses
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G. Existing Laws in the United States Do Not Apply to the Use of Sex and
Trait Selection Technologies.
No federal or state laws exist in the United States regulating the use of
preconception sex and trait selection techniques.214 Current laws that prohibit
research or experimentation on embryos are the closest potential sources of
regulation, but they fail to extend to preconception sex and trait selection.215 A
few states have laws prohibiting the use of abortion to selection the sex of
one’s offspring; similar legislation has been proposed at the federal level.216
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Executive Summary, June
1997) called for a continuation of moratorium on any federal funding for
research involving human cloning and a call for all private individuals and
institutions to comply with this moratorium on human cloning.217
Even if no laws are enacted prohibiting the use of reproductive
technologies to select the sex and characteristics of one’s offspring, funding
should not be provided to support these decisions. The Due Process Clause of
the Constitution generally confers no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government may not deprive the individual.218 The
government is under no obligation to provide funding in support of the
advantages conferred by those rights which are protected as fundamental
liberty interests.219

the exploitation of persons from a lower socioeconomic background, certain ethnic groups, and
women).
214. See Lopez, supra note 16, at 173 (noting that the only use of reproductive technology
which is regulated is the use of articifical insemination and surrogate motherhood). The
legislature failed to enact legislation regulating other areas of reproductive technology to any
significant degree since that time.
215. Norton, supra note 208, at 1615-19 (considering federal regulations on fetal
experimentation and state laws prohibiting fetal research).
216. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(8) (2002) (prohibiting any person from
intentionally performing an abortion when the person has knowledge that the pregnant woman is
seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus); Civil Rights of Infants Act, S. 76,
107th Cong. § 2(b) (2001) (making it a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States to perform an abortion with the knowledge that the abortion is being
performed solely because of the gender of the fetus).
217. LISA YOUNT, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 269-270 (2000) (noting
that bans on the use of reproductive technologies are often included with laws regulating human
cloning).
218. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 491-92 (1989). The government has no
constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is constitutionally
protected and may validly choose to fund one activity over another based upon the state’s
preferences. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980).
219. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-194 (1991); Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-318.
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H. Law Existing in Other Countries
Current legislation in other countries is aimed at restricting abortions for
the use of fetus sex selection. In India, where fetuses are often aborted because
they are female, the use of amniocentesis is limited to screen for potential
medical abnormalities.220
In Canada, laws prohibiting the gender selection of children for nonmedical purposes were introduced on May 3, 2001, and are currently under
consideration.221 Europeans express outrage at the concept of selecting the sex
or characteristics of one’s children for non-medical reasons.222 However, this

220. Radhika Balakrishnan, The Social Context of Sex Selection and the Politics of Abortion
in India, in POWER AND DECISION: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF REPRODUCTION, 278 (Gita Sen &
Rachel C. Snow eds., 1994). The author urges the enactment of legislation to remain current with
advancing technologies which will permit the use of pre-birth sex selection in other ways. The
expansion of medical technologies permitting sex selection may be more difficult to regulate.
221. See Canada Proposes Reproduction Laws, TIMES UNION (Albany), May 6, 2001, at A6,
available at 2001 WL 6305119. The committee of health of the House of Commons is studying
the legislation, with a report on the draft law anticipated in January 2002. See also Danis, supra
note 12, at 261 (noting that the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies
has recommended a ban on all sex selection except where medically indicated for sex-linked
diseases).
222. See They’re Opening Pandora’s Box to Designer Babies Modern Dilemma: Tragic
Couple’s Bid for Baby Girl Unethical, Says Professor, BIRMINGHAM POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at 9
(reporting the concern of a medical law and ethics professor in Scotland who is concerned that
Europeans will use European Convention of Human Rights legislation to gain permission for
gender diagnosis for non-medical reasons); GOSDEN, supra note 30, at 173. See also Deryck
Beyleveld & Shaun Pattison, Legal Regulation of Assisted Procreation, Genetic Diagnosis and
Gene Therapy, in THE ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 215, 241 (Hille Haker &
Deryck Beyleveld eds., 2000) (advising that the United Kingdom licensing authority advised
reproductive clinics and sex selection for social reasons is unacceptable). The UK licensing
authority advises the clinics that it licenses that sex selection for social reasons is unacceptable.
Jurgen Simon, Comment on Legal Regulation of Assisted Procreation, Genetic Diagnosis and
Gene Therapy, in THE ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 289 (Hille Haker &
Deryck Beyleveld eds., 2000). Portugal and Italy were considering legislation in this area in 2000
(noting that the resolution of the European Parliament from March 1997 condemns the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, judging it to be a violation of human dignity that should not be
accepted by any society). Sandra Dick, Be It Boy or Girl, Let’s Choose Life, EVENING NEWS
(Scotland), July 9, 2001, at 11, available at 2001 WL 24048983 (reporting that Scottish secretary
Dr. Bill O’Neill is full of condemnation of a clinic opening in Glasgow which will allow wouldbe parents to choose the sex of their baby). The article addresses the “slippery slope” argument
that the selection of sex will lead to the selection of characteristics such as hair color, intelligence,
and the shape of the baby’s fingernails. Id. Technology is available for patients utilizing IVF
treatment to choose the sex of embryos, although in the United Kingdom sex selection is
permitted only where a genetic disease is carried with the male sex. Id. Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia,
Assisted Reproduction in Greece, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND PRACTICE OF
ASSISTED PROCREATION 285 (Donald Evans ed., 1996). Similarly, in Greece, sex selection is
prohibited except to prevent serious sex-linked hereditary disease. Id. at 285. However, no state
legislation exists, so reproductive technologies may be used in the private sector to select sex. Id.
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contempt for the use of reproductive technologies for arbitrary reasons is
unregulated in many European countries with the laws governing
preimplantation genetic diagnosis varying to a large degree.223 The large
variation of restrictions imposed by foreign legislation on assisted reproduction
suggests that foreign governments struggle to find a place within current
regulation of conception, abortion, and family law under which assisted
reproduction should fall.224 It is likely that legislators in the United States will
face similar difficulties in finding a firm basis for laws regulating
preconception sex and trait selection technologies under the present regulation
scheme.
I.

The Need for Legislation

It is now time to face the legal, ethical, and policy issues rising from
parents’ ability to select or shape the characteristics of their offspring and the
potential of government regulation in this area.225 The need for legislation is
apparent as the accuracy and availability of preconception selection technology
becomes available.226 Because the decision to select the sex and characteristics
of one’s offspring does not fall into one of the well-established constitutional
law areas, courts may flounder at reaching consistent decisions.
A statute regulating the use of nontherapeutic preimplantation genetic
diagnosis must carefully define the term “nontherapeutic” in order to withstand
a challenge for unconstitutional vagueness.227 Because this type of arbitrary
Further, the proposed French Bioethics Law attempts to maintain the “dignity of the individual”
by prohibiting any research which threatens the integrity of humans. Id. at 285-86. While no
government statement related this to preconception sex selection, choosing a child based upon
arbitrary reasons such as sex and characteristics inherently undermines the child’s worth.
223. Beyleveld & Pattison, supra note 222, at 238-49 (dividing the laws into the following
groups: legislation permitting preimplantation genetic diagnosis—Denmark, France, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Countries with legislation prohibiting pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis; countries without legislation permitting pre-implantation genetic diagnosis by
default—Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain; countries without legislation
prohibiting pre-implantation genetic diagnosis by default—France, Ireland, and Luxembourg).
Where laws do exist in the area of assisted procreation and genetic diagnosis, it typically prohibits
reproductive cloning and germ-line therapy, either prohibits non-therapeutic embryo research or
subjects it to conditions, permits abortion and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and regulates
those assisted reproductive techniques that involve the storage or use or embryos outside the
body.
224. Id. at 216-21 (varying from no restrictions to no access to these services). Many
European countries limit the use of assisted reproduction based on criteria such as marital status,
sexual orientation, years of cohabitation, age of female, the absence of children, and health
reasons. Id. at 224.
225. Robertson, supra note 6, at 423.
226. Danis, supra note 12, at 222 (proposing a complete ban on sex selection).
227. See Norton, supra note 208, at 1616 (discussing a less advanced reproductive technology
to select offspring traits, but which implicates the same issues).
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“ordering” of child characteristics does not fall under individuals’ procreative
liberty interests of rights of privacy, no constitutional rights are jeopardized by
regulation in this area.
Instead of leaving the judiciary to struggle to find a place for
preconception sex and characteristic selection, regulation must be enacted to
deal with these issues. States should have the power to regulate any form of
genetic manipulation of the reproductive process to the extent necessary to
protect autonomy, to prevent private gender discrimination, to prevent skewing
of the gender and genetic pool and to prevent any one person or entity from
controlling and upsetting the genetic development of future generations.228
Given the extensive harms which may result from the utilization of
preconception sex and characteristic selection, regulation in this area meets the
rationale state interest standard necessary to uphold state regulation where a
liberty interest is not at stake.
The United States lags behind technological advances in developing a clear
social policy regulating the use of technology to select the sex of one’s
offspring.229 Some argue that legislation should be enacted to regulate the use
of procreative technologies so scarce medical resources will be given priority
over these procreative technologies.230 A complete ban on all types of preimplantation sex selection technology is advocated by some as not being
contrary to constitutional rights.231 Others call, not for a complete ban of
preconception sex selection, but for moderate measures to identify and prevent
any serious harm as selective reproductive technology develops.232 Even those
persons who contend that parental use of trait selection technologies should be

228. See Lopez, supra note 16 (considering whether the use of sex selection technology
implicates individual autonomy so strongly as to be deemed fundamental and emphasizing that
the courts should seek solutions that maximizes autonomy and concurrently prevents harm to
others.).
229. Danis, supra note 12, at 263. Considering the swift pace of evolution in this field, sex
selection is already an established technology and is thus likely to become entrenched in medical
practice and social consciousness unless an immediate response follows.
230. See Donald Evans, Creating the Child, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW,
AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 8 (Donald Evans ed., 1996).
231. Danis, supra note 12, at 245 (concluding that a ban on most types of pre-implantation
sex selection technology is safely within constitutional bounds, but noting that some may argue
that an individual’s choice to use alternative reproductive technology, including sex selection
technology, is an exercise or personal liberty).
232. Remaley, supra note 20, at 297-98. These moderate steps would prevent serious harm.
Id. Other measures include requiring couples to donate their left-over sperm or embryos, while
could be used for infertile couples. Id. Remaley advocates enacting measures now to detect and
evaluate the use and effects of preconception sex selection (and trait selection) so as to avoid
delay if it becomes apparent that a prohibition is necessary. Id. at 292-98. One measure that is
ripe for implementation is to create a waiting list for parents who want to use these reproductive
technologies. Id. at 292.
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afforded the same Constitutional protection as other matters of family,
parenting, and procreation agree that some limitations must apply.233
One proposed solution is to enact legislation ensuring a sex balance in the
population, but this solution fails to address the other harms created by
preconception sex and trait selection, such as discrimination against women,
social and psychological consequences for offspring, and deterrent affects on
the parent-child relationship.234 This type of legislation is insufficient to deter
the potential harms implicit in preconception sex and trait selection.235
Legislation is necessary to prohibit preconception sex and trait selection before
the harms involved are beyond control. Trait and sex selection of children’s
characteristics should not be protected as fundamental rights. The use of these
reproductive technologies suggest a realm of rights not yet addressed by the
court, but involving different concerns, issues, rights, and harms that previous
family and reproductive decisions have not addressed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current legislation does not place any obstacles in the path of parents who
want to choose the sex and traits of their offspring prior to conception.
Previous Supreme Court decisions protecting decisions related to family and
conception do not incorporate these preconception decisions. The harms
associated with sex and trait selection are dissimilar from the harms involved
in these previous cases. Preconception sex and trait selection pose detrimental
consequences both to the children produced with the use of these reproductive
technologies, other children in their families, and others in society. Seminal
Supreme Court decisions deal with parents rights to choose measures related to
the care, education, and upbringing of their children, and the rights of women
and men to choose whether or not to have a child. The rights associated with
these prior decisions does not extend to permit parents to choose the sex and
traits of their offspring prior to conception. It is imperative that legislators
draft regulations to prohibit the use of sex and trait selection for arbitrary
reasons.
KELLY M. PLUMMER236

233. See Jones, supra note 4, at 189 (arguing that trait selection technologies should be
permitted to select for any trait using any method unless it is clearly and significantly damaging
to the future child).
234. Remaley, supra note 20, at 292-93.
235. Id. at 293. Further, the difficulties inherent in enforcing a sex balance make this
proposition undesirable.
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